Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) Framework:
An Emergency Preparedness Access Implementation and Best Practice Guide

March 2018
Acknowledgements

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The CERRA Framework builds upon the foundational elements of the ESSCC original access and re-entry related Joint Standard Operating Procedure (JSOP), existing state and local access programs, and national association related guidance. The developmental process benefited greatly from the collaborative efforts of the Joint CERRA Working Group membership and other identified subject matter experts. The joint working group included participation from the following organizations:

**Government and Sector Coordinating Councils**
- Chemical
- Commercial Facilities
- Emergency Services
- Energy
- Financial Services
- Healthcare and Public Health
- Transportation Systems
- Water and Wastewater
- State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial

**Federal Departments and Agencies**
- FEMA National Integration Center
- FEMA National Business Emergency Operations Center
- Department of Energy
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Transportation
- Environmental Protection Agency

**National Associations and other Coordinating Councils**
- National Emergency Management Association
- American Public Works Association
- Regional Consortium Coordinating Council

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Cover photographs L to R: 1) Urban Search and Rescue team marks a house as they conduct a search in neighborhood impacted by Hurricane Ike. 2) Task Force works to strategize how best to respond to Hurricane Harvey. 3) Disaster survivors meet with Small Business Administration (SBA) customer service representative to receive information about SBA disaster assistance for those who suffered damage or losses from Hurricane Harvey. Courtesy of FEMA.
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Executive Summary

The capability for State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities to safely, securely, and effectively control and coordinate the access of key response and recovery resources into an affected area during an emergency has been identified as a critical success factor in enabling overall community recovery. The Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) Framework focuses on supporting State, local, and regional efforts to enable the successful transit and access of critical response and recovery resources before, during, and after emergencies.

This Framework builds upon prior and existing efforts by the Emergency Services Sector Coordinating Council (ESSCC) and multiple State and local crisis access and re-entry programs to cooperatively define a common approach based on best practices to enhance communities’ preparation, response, recovery, and resilience efforts during incident management operations.

This Framework is intended as voluntary guidance for SLTT government and law enforcement entities, when planning and developing an access management plan or program. The recommended common approach described in this Framework is meant to be integrated into a SLTT government’s emergency preparedness planning in accordance with its use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS).

The CERRA Framework supports public, private, volunteer, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in facilitating their response and recovery efforts. It provides mechanisms, tools, and process approaches for coordinating, approving, and enabling access during response and recovery operations. The methods, tools, and templates presented in this Framework are intended to enable SLTT governments to define and establish local programs and approaches that can successfully interoperate nationwide.

The CERRA Framework describes a common approach by which communities can:

• Manage and control access for their jurisdiction;
• Develop a consistent, repeatable process to coordinate with response and recovery organizations that require access to or transit through a restricted area or emergency zone;
• Support outreach, education, and communication to ensure all stakeholders understand designated access requirements and procedures; and
• Coordinate with law enforcement to implement access controls throughout an emergency.
Introduction

Prior to any natural or manmade disaster, each community should have an emergency preparedness plan to enable response and recovery personnel to conduct incident management and recovery operations. Part of the overall preparedness plan should include a Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) process for managing access into and transit through restricted areas or emergency zones.

The process of managing access into restricted areas or emergency zones during an incident is controlled at the State, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTT) level, and can become increasingly difficult when disasters extend across multiple jurisdictions and geographies. In addition, controlling access to affected areas is not only a priority for incident managers and first responders, but also a concern for business owners, critical infrastructure operators, and community members. The process of granting organizations and individuals access to facilities, businesses, and homes following an incident can substantially add to the level of complexity required to manage the incident. These types of operational challenges can directly affect response and recovery timelines, as well as overall operational success. These operational challenges can be overcome by the adoption of a common approach for managing access and phased re-entry.

Use of a common approach for managing access and phased re-entry is particularly important during incidents that require significant population evacuations to ensure the flow of essential commodities, coordination of public or private sector response and recovery assets, and restoration of critical infrastructure and essential public services, as well as a safe and orderly return of community members to an affected area. Across the Nation throughout multiple incidents and response activities, those responsible for managing access into emergency zones have experienced delays in response and recovery efforts caused by the lack of common access and phased re-entry protocols. By adopting the common approach described within the CERRA Framework, jurisdictions will be able to further enhance the access elements of their emergency preparedness plans and accelerate their community’s recovery.

This voluntary guidance is not intended as a Federal directive to any entity, and nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal, State, or local agencies under statutory authority, nor should this guidance be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the laws of any jurisdiction. Use of the CERRA Framework by SLTT government and law enforcement entities is intended to supplement existing national incident management guidance and preparedness doctrine (e.g., National Incident Management System [NIMS], Incident Command System [ICS], the National Response Framework [NRF] and National Disaster Recovery Framework [NDRF]), to provide another tool for common incident management practice.

Purpose of the document

To provide SLTT governments and their associated entities a framework to guide the implementation of a common approach to manage access requirements when planning for and responding to events and incidents.
Definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions are used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>The entry to an incident scene, an incident-affected area, or the controlled or restricted roadways supporting the incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Program</td>
<td>The structured process and technology used to enable access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Authorization</td>
<td>The procedures and systems defined by state and local authorities to allow access. Access Authorization, when applied in terms of attribute-based access control (ABAC), may be based on required identification, credentials, permissions, or organizational affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Token</td>
<td>The defined visual and electronic standards used for approval of access into a restricted area or emergency zone. Based on jurisdictional access rules visual and/or electronic tokens, to include access cards, letters of access, and vehicle placards, may be used for access control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>Any incident, whether natural, technological, or human-caused, that necessitates responsive action to protect life or property</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Zone</td>
<td>A geographically-defined area that is affected, or is expected to be affected, by an emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance Board</td>
<td>The body or group of individuals that have oversight over a local, state, or regional access program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>An occurrence, natural or manmade, that necessitates a response to protect life or property; in this document, the word “incident” includes planned events as well as emergencies and/or disasters of all kinds and sizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phased Re-entry</td>
<td>The process of managing access and re-entry into a restricted area or emergency zone, in support of response and recovery operations, by categorizing responders and other affected stakeholders into functional groups that may be prioritized for access and re-entry as an incident progresses (e.g. first responders and other incident management personnel, local business owners and utility operators, community members, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Event</td>
<td>An incident that is a scheduled non-emergency activity (e.g. sporting event, concert, parade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Area</td>
<td>A geographical area within a jurisdiction in which authorized government officials have restricted access to maintain public safety or protect property</td>
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</table>

Common Approach

Overview

The CERRA Framework has been developed to enable SLTT jurisdictions to establish their own access programs utilizing a common approach, recommended best practices, and standard tools and terminology. It is intended that jurisdictions utilize this Framework as a template or operational model to enable coordinated access procedures not only within their jurisdiction for limited size emergencies, but also across multiple jurisdictions during large-scale incidents to effectively support emergency management operations, including protection and restoration of critical infrastructure, municipal and community lifelines, and public safety.

Operational Concept

The challenge facing communities managing access during an incident is one of complexity and coordination. Use of an access program enables a coordinated effort across multiple response and recovery organizations and stakeholders to define:

- Restricted areas—WHERE access restrictions need to be put in place and entry controlled;
- Access Rules—WHO, WHICH, and WHEN personnel may enter; and,
- Access Authorization procedures—HOW personnel may gain access.
SLTT jurisdictions should detail their access program in an access plan or access program instruction, as part of their overall emergency preparedness plan. Access plans should include processes for incidents of varying size and complexity, including those that cross-jurisdictional boundaries. Access plans for large-scale incidents should include a review of legal authorities, an understanding of jurisdictional boundaries, and as necessary memoranda of understanding (MOUs)/memoranda of agreement (MOAs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to fill resource or operational gaps.

Appendix A of this document contains representative case studies to illustrate these points. Figure 1 below introduces the different stakeholder communities crucial to access solutions.

![Figure 1. CERRA Stakeholder Coordination Requirements](image)

### Key Components and Best Practices

The successful implementation of an access program is a combination of prior planning, relationship management, and stakeholder interaction; well-defined access protocols and implementation procedures; and tools to facilitate informing and educating incident affected stakeholders and responders.

The following sections are organized to:

1. Outline the recommended key components necessary to establish an access program;
2. Identify recommended best practices to enable program success; and,
3. Discuss pertinent access planning considerations pertaining to critical infrastructure response and recovery stakeholders.

### Definition of Authority

Jurisdictions interested in establishing an access program should first review their locally defined lines of authority and existing control and management procedures regarding issuance of evacuation orders and the establishment of access restrictions during emergencies.

The authority to issue evacuation orders and establish access criteria traditionally exists with the State governor. However, governors often delegate this authority to local officials, and this delegation may be codified by local statutes or ordinances. In these cases, the responsibility and authority for determining the access status, requirements, and permissions necessary to enter a restricted area, reside with the designated local official within the affected jurisdiction.

### Best Practice

Confirm which State and local authority is empowered to issue evacuation orders, define access requirements, and conduct re-entry operations.
Depending on the type of incident or local statutes, senior officials may elect to delegate the required authorities to the local emergency manager, sheriff, police chief, or fire chief. An access plan or access program instruction should clearly define the process for delegating authority and explain the extent of such authority.

However, in some communities, local officials do not have the legal authority to fully evacuate a residential area, while others may require a disaster declaration before the jurisdictional authority can institute a mandatory evacuation. Understanding the definition of authority to issue evacuation orders and establish access criteria allows communities to better prepare alternatives and plans prior to an incident occurring.

**Best Practice**

Access programs should have clearly defined roles and responsibilities across response and recovery stakeholders.

**Roles and Responsibilities**

Proper implementation of an access program requires the coordinated efforts of many elements of a community. The access plan and planning considerations should be aligned with State or local operational requirements, constraints, and security considerations, as well as the interests of key elements of the community. Community officials and emergency planners should meet with public, private, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and volunteer organizations, which may be affected by or potentially assist with an incident, during the planning process to increase awareness of critical infrastructure sector dependencies, interdependencies, and restoration priorities to define responsibilities, minimize recovery time, and set reasonable expectations. Emergency managers should be aware of local or regional critical infrastructure sector mutual aid plans, and that these plans are coordinated with other jurisdictions and organizations to support potential resource requirements.

Community officials and emergency planners should define responsibility for managing access and re-entry during the planning processes. Clear lines of authority, responsibility, and coordination requirements between differing organizations and incident stakeholders should be included in the access program instruction. Incorporation of these critical elements into the access program instruction enables both local and State programs to better interoperate, prevent operational issues, and enhance coordination between all incident-related stakeholders.

Once restricted area and access requirements have been defined and activated, it is typically the responsibility of law enforcement to enforce restrictions and control access. Law enforcement, in coordination with their respective emergency management agency, should exercise the local access program during routine events to maintain familiarity with the program’s procedures.
Establishment of a Governance Board

The concept of a Governance Board is to provide an ongoing forum to engage and partner with key stakeholders across the community to develop, establish, and maintain an access program. The Governance Board is a planning body and should be led by the State or local official with the authority to administer the access program. The role of a Governance Board is to assist in development of the access plan, provide insight into potential access needs, and collaborate on coordination and implementation procedures. It is recommended that a State or local Governance Board consist of representatives from their respective jurisdictions and Emergency Support Functions (ESF), or organizations that represent these functions within their community, as identified in their Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). Governance Board membership should be driven by State or local definition of authority, roles and responsibilities, and stakeholder interest in the State or local community (e.g., key critical infrastructure owners/operators and other community lifeline partners).

A key to the success of a Governance Board is implementation of an inclusive participation process. Through outreach to public sector, private sector, NGOs, and volunteer organizations, the Governance Board may gain insight into potential incident scenarios that may require use of the access program. By partnering with these organizations, the community will develop a more robust view of potential requirements, breadth of capabilities, and personnel needed to achieve a successful response and recovery. By leveraging the requirements derived from stakeholder interaction and potential scenarios, access program managers can establish the access program processes, including phased re-entry, access authorization, access tokens, and access checkpoints most relevant to meeting the needs of their community.

In smaller communities or rural areas, local officials may fulfill the governance function through a single person, or consider partnering with neighboring jurisdictions and the State Emergency Management Agency to form a regional Governance Board.

Best Practice

Establish a cooperative forum to engage and partner with relevant stakeholders to develop an access plan or program.

Phased Re-entry

Phased re-entry refers to the process of granting access to an incident site and other restricted areas by aligning response and recovery personnel and other affected stakeholders (e.g., local business owners, utility operators, community members) into functional groupings, and managing re-entry via defined access levels (sometimes referred to as “tiers”). Access level definitions may be based on incident management priorities, response and recovery needs, incident site...
conditions and safety concerns. Depending on the size and scope of the incident, public works assessments of critical facilities, roads, checkpoints, roadblocks, and transit routes may be required to enable access.

Use of a phased re-entry process provides the capability for communities to define and pre-plan into their EOP the order of response and recovery resources authorized for access, as well as ensure a safe and orderly return to an affected area by community members.

The goals of the phased re-entry approach are to:

1. Define access levels that can align conditions within the affected area to required response and recovery assets needed throughout the timeline of an incident. For example: along with first responders conducting lifesaving operations (i.e., under AL-1), critical infrastructure facility owners may require access to relieve onsite personnel, provide security, or conduct facility shutdown procedures; communications personnel may require access to sustain or restore critical communications services (e.g., cell towers, 911 call centers, first responder communications).

2. Standardize access related terminology and visual cues (colors/numbers/shapes associated with pre-defined access tokens) to support an efficient and effective access control process; and

3. Enable the activation of specific or additional access requirements as the incident response dictates (e.g., Access Level 1 [HAZMAT] may delineate that hazardous materials response certification is required for access).

Best Practice

Implement an access program that utilizes a phased re-entry methodology.

Recommended phased re-entry access levels are shown in Figure 2, with additional information in Appendix B. The access level descriptions below have been developed through best practices and are compatible with NIMS and ICS. Depending on the incident and jurisdiction’s EOP, the local authority may need to modify the suggested functional groupings to match the required incident response and local requirements.

ACCESS LEVEL 1 (AL-1) – EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Emergency response assets may include Emergency Services personnel (i.e., law enforcement, fire and rescue, emergency medical services [EMS], and public works), along with utility crews. Responders in this access level or tier have immediate access into the affected area to conduct public safety operations, provide essential medical services, and assess immediate needs. Depending on the scope of the incident, public works and utility crews may be needed to stabilize an incident by completing activities such as removing down power lines, shutting off broken water mains, turning off natural gas service, or clearing debris from roads to allow other emergency responders to get to needed locations. The desired outcome for this access level is to mitigate the effects of the emergency, conduct rescue and lifesaving operations, and stabilize the affected area.

ACCESS LEVEL 2 (AL-2) – RESPONSE SUPPORT

After first responders have mitigated initial threats to life and safety within all or part of an emergency zone, the local authority may authorize Response Support personnel to re-enter the affected area to assess, maintain, protect, or initiate recovery of critical services and facilities. Depending on the incident and needs of the community, Response Support assets should include essential personnel required to support protection or restoration of essential community lifeline functions (e.g., hospitals, utilities, critical infrastructure facilities, common carrier logistics and transportation hubs, etc.), as well as resources needed to assist in supporting lifesaving or lifesustaining emergency operations. The
desired outcome for this access level is the restoration of critical services and sustainment of emergency response operations to reduce or prevent cascading effects. Response Support activities should be coordinated with relevant levels of government and the private sector.

**ACCESS LEVEL 3 (AL-3) – RECOVERY SUPPORT**

Recovery Support assets include facility operators, government or business employees, and NGO and volunteer organizations that may assist recovery efforts, or further enable restoration of community lifelines and essential services. Examples include retail locations, banking and insurance providers, grocery stores, disaster remediation services, volunteer organizations active in disasters (VOAD), construction and trades contractors, etc. Once conditions have stabilized with basic protection and emergency services reestablished, Recovery Support personnel may re-enter the incident area at the appropriate authority’s discretion. The desired outcome for this access level is to begin recovery efforts and the restoration of sufficient infrastructure to support re-entry into the affected area by the general public or residential population (e.g., functioning utilities, basic commodities available, emergency services restored).

**ACCESS LEVEL 4 (AL-4) – GENERAL RETURN**

In the last grouping, non-essential personnel, the residential population, and general public may be authorized to re-enter. Residents and business operators may be asked to present photo identification (ID) and proof of residence, or company affiliation prior to re-entry of business areas and neighborhoods, and should be informed of which areas are authorized for re-entry, any curfew restrictions, and any ongoing response or recovery operations in or adjacent to their community. Depending on the site conditions and safety considerations, some residents may return before others, or be allowed temporary access to inspect their homes, remove personal items, etc., but not reoccupy their residence.

**Access Coordination**

The implementation of an access program can involve the coordination, cooperation, and integration of multiple government, private sector, and NGOs or volunteer groups. To facilitate an effective, efficient, and interoperable access program that promotes whole community response and recovery, State and local officials should ensure their access program is capable of:

- Providing management, communication, and coordination of locally defined access authorization processes and attribute-based access control criteria to facilitate access before, during, and after an incident;
- Providing shared awareness across local, State, regional, and national collaborative and information-sharing platforms and portals to enhance response and recovery activities (e.g., establishing and maintaining an externally accessible summary of current access and re-entry restrictions to facilitate planning by organizations or individuals seeking to travel into affected areas);
- Registering organizations desiring to pre-enroll in the access program before an incident, as well as an immediate or “just-in-time” access approval process for unplanned resources or unanticipated requests for access from individuals and organizations during incidents;
- Providing for multiple delivery methods (e.g., primary – electronic; secondary – paper distribution) of access tokens to enabled efficient access management; and
- Conducting widespread outreach and education regarding the access program to all stakeholders including government, law enforcement, businesses, and the public.

**Best Practice**

Establish an ongoing process to manage, update, coordinate, and educate the community and private sector partners on the access program. Consider engaging local, State, or regional business emergency operation centers.

**Access Authorization**

One challenge of managing access is providing a simple process to coordinate and approve resources for access into restricted areas.

Access authorization is the system or set of procedures defined by State or local authorities to allow access. Utilization of an access authorization process that
relies on a combination of validated attributes (e.g., identification, credentials, organizational affiliation) to assist with making access approval decisions provides

**Best Practice**

Leverage a common access authorization system or procedures to facilitate interoperability with other jurisdictions.

local authorities with a wide range of controls when managing access. The goal of such an approach focuses on simplifying the capability to coordinate with the organizations requiring access and the law enforcement entities enforcing the defined access controls.

A jurisdiction may utilize paper or electronic-based access tokens as part of its access authorization process, or leverage existing secure identity verification or credentialing methods to enable access. These secure forms of identification (e.g., the Transportation Worker Identification Credential [TWIC] card, Federal Government issued Personal Identity Verification [PIV] card), along with a valid need to enter, may provide a high level of assurance in making the access decision. Some jurisdictions may utilize a third party provider to act as a trusted agent or authoritative source to manage and validate predefined access attributes (e.g., verification of identity, employment, certification) to assist the jurisdiction in making the access decision.

**Just-in-Time Access**

Another challenge of managing access during an incident is developing a workable process to grant immediate or “just-in-time” access approval for unplanned resources or unanticipated requests from individuals and organizations. Part of the challenge is establishing an effective method of collecting the requests for access, without being overwhelmed by the adjudication process, while potentially being fully engaged in incident management operations. The review and adjudication of the requests can be time consuming, require direct coordination, necessitate the in-transit delivery of access tokens, and communication of acceptable forms of identification. Accounting for “just-in-time” access can be a difficult task for even the most practiced jurisdictions.

The CERRA Framework details the various components needed for development of a successful access program. Through implementation of the common approach described with the Framework, jurisdictions may be better enabled to manage “just-in-time” access requests.

**Access Tokens**

Access tokens are paper-based, identification-card based, or electronic-based elements (e.g., vehicle placards and letter of access; recognized credentials and access cards; mobile tokens) used at access checkpoints to enable law enforcement or other checkpoint personnel (e.g., National Guard, or private security) to validate approval for access.

**Best Practice**

Utilize a standard set of access tokens to support local access programs and facilitate cross-jurisdictional interoperability.
Use of standard access tokens assists in standardizing operational procedures for validating access permissions across incident-related checkpoints, and provides for a common, secure, and effective mechanism to manage phased re-entry of resources into an affected area, while enabling flexibility and interoperability with other jurisdictions. Local jurisdictions may tailor access tokens to incorporate additional elements (e.g., incident or event name, county or organizational emblem, specific access level requirements) for specific incidents or to enable interoperability with other jurisdictions. Any such tailored token elements should be coordinated with all relevant jurisdictions, private sector partners, and State entities, as required in order to maintain stakeholder situational awareness. Appendix C provides sample formats and recommended elements for access tokens.

Temporary or Enabling Access Solutions

During an incident, there may be the need for a temporary or ad hoc access solution to facilitate the flow of essential commodities, public or private sector response assets, or restoration of critical infrastructure to enable response or recovery operations (e.g., resupply gasoline stations in support of an evacuation). The following are common methods of temporarily managing emergent access requirements. However, these approaches often require direct coordination, communication, and de-confliction; as such they are not intended to support long-term or broad access and re-entry coordination.

EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS

An emergency declaration can help enable access and re-entry. In support of an incident, a State may issue an emergency declaration and include provisions to facilitate access and re-entry to or through its borders to assist with response and recovery efforts. Issuing States should consider coordinating with the affected and neighboring States to ensure the provisions in their emergency declarations are in agreement.

COORDINATION THROUGH EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS (EOCs) AND BUSINESS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS (BEOCs)

A State or local jurisdiction may establish a temporary process to receive and coordinate access requests directly through its EOC. If approved for access, the State or local EOC may issue an access token (e.g., vehicle placard), or coordinate with checkpoint personnel to allow the individual or organization access. In addition, some States and regions maintain a BEOC through a public-private partnership, which may serve as a hub during incidents for sharing information between public and private sector stakeholders, coordinating resources, and supporting local response operations where possible. Private sector organizations can coordinate access requests through the BEOC, in coordination with the State or local EOC and private sector liaisons.

Figure 3. Nationwide State BEOC/PPP

[Map showing nationwide state BEOC/PPP status]

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LETTERS OF ACCESS
Companies or organizations, in coordination with State or local jurisdictions, may utilize an event-specific Letter of Access (LOA) to facilitate re-entry into restricted areas during an incident. The local or State Emergency Management Agency may issue guidance requesting the LOA be on official letterhead, provide a brief explanation of the role of the personnel requiring access, or specify the critical nature of the supplies attempting to be delivered. These letters are carried by the employees and shown at security checkpoints, along with a government or company-issued form of identification. These letters may be printed or laminated, contain company and government agency logos side by side, and placed in vehicles as placards.

Access Checkpoints
Access Checkpoints are locations utilized by law enforcement or other checkpoint personnel to enable the access or denial of individuals and resources into restricted areas or emergency zones during incidents. Checkpoints are typically established and manned by law enforcement, but may be augmented by other State or local resources (e.g., National Guardsmen, rural community emergency response team members or volunteer fire fighters), and in some cases private security personnel. A checkpoint security assessment should be utilized to ensure adequate responder protection and safety. The following provides an outline of potential checkpoint models.

Best Practice
Define, document, train, and communicate standard processes to establish, manage, and operate checkpoints.

OUTER PERIMETER CHECKPOINT
Outer Perimeter Checkpoints are established outside of the emergency zones at a sufficient distance to facilitate restricting access of unapproved personnel and resources. Law enforcement, in conjunction with emergency management personnel, should consider establishing these checkpoints to provide both a buffer around the emergency zone and a clear flow of access for response and recovery personnel. Characteristics of an Outer Perimeter Checkpoint may include:

- A location where traffic management is a priority and risk from the incident to response and recovery personnel is relatively low.
- A location suitable to allow for a cursory review of an individual and his or her vehicle by checkpoint personnel. A visual inspection of a vehicle placard may be sufficient for entry.
- An area or roadway large enough where vehicle placards can be leveraged to form multiple lanes of traffic segmented by access priority (e.g., no placard vs. placard, or by access levels).
- Co-located with a designated staging area.
- An area where individuals can be directed to a secondary area nearby or rerouted to the command post, or staging area, for a further, more detailed review as needed.
- A location suitable for the re-direction or U-turn of vehicles not authorized to enter the restricted area. The area should be large enough to accommodate large semi-truck traffic.

INNER PERIMETER CHECKPOINT
Inner Perimeter Checkpoints are recommended to be established at or near the boundary of the emergency zone as a mechanism to control access into and out of the restricted area by approved personnel and resources. Law enforcement, in conjunction with emergency management personnel, should consider establishing these checkpoints to both facilitate efficient access to critical areas and support establishment of secure areas to protect the community and personnel. Characteristics of an Inner Perimeter Checkpoint may include:

- A location where risk to response and recovery personnel is higher than at the Outer Perimeter Checkpoint, due to proximity to the incident or ability to move to a safer area quickly.
- A location where a more detailed or scrutinized review of a person’s identity and verification documents is appropriate.
- A visual or electronic inspection of access tokens or verification by checkpoint personnel of an individual’s information contained in the access program system.
• A location suitable for the re-direction or U-turn of vehicles not authorized to enter the restricted area.
• The area should be large enough to accommodate large semi-truck traffic.

Local jurisdictions with limited staffing numbers may struggle to achieve both an outer and an inner perimeter. In these cases, jurisdictions should consider combining the most essential requirements of each perimeter to best control access and security with their available resources.

**SPOT CHECKS**

Law enforcement personnel may conduct random spot checks to verify access authorization throughout an incident to maintain security and public safety.

Characteristics of a Spot Check may include:

• A detailed or scrutinized review of an individual’s access tokens or access program record in the access control system.

• May occur in any location throughout the restricted area or emergency zone, to include designated mustering points or staging areas.

• May occur at the discretion of law enforcement personnel, prompted by a person’s suspicious behavior or geographic location within the emergency zone or restricted area.

• An increased risk to law enforcement personnel, when engaging unauthorized or distressed individuals.

**Conclusion**

Having the ability to effectively control access and re-entry during incidents enables first responders, emergency management personnel, and local officials to effectively manage emergency response operations, reduce the likelihood of injury or loss of life, safeguard critical infrastructure sites against unauthorized access, and aid in whole community recovery. The CERRA Framework informs local officials and emergency planners of key components and best practices to consider when planning for access and re-entry operations. The common approach for crisis access management described within this Framework is supportive and complementary to existing national incident management guidance and preparedness doctrine. Although different efforts throughout the United States have implemented similar phased re-entry methodologies, the adoption of a common approach will not only aid SLTT jurisdictions in developing access plans, but also enhance existing State and local access programs and facilitate greater interoperability nationwide. By adopting the common process approach, recommended best practices, and standard tools and terminology described within this Framework, jurisdictions will be able to further enhance the access elements of their emergency preparedness plans and accelerate their community’s recovery.
Appendix A: Case Studies

The following representative case studies are intended to emphasize the importance of emergency preparedness and pre-planning for crisis access management, regardless of an incident’s type, scale, or severity.

Case Study 1: Chemical Facility Response & Recovery

**CHALLENGE**
Coordination of access management and control for a critical manufacturing facility.

**SCENARIO**
A local chemical facility has a robust response and recovery plan in place. During a severe weather emergency, the plant manager ceases operations and evacuates the facility to protect personnel. The only personnel who remain are critical security and operations members (i.e., a ride-out crew). Extreme damage from the storm requires the local jurisdiction to activate its access control program, defining an emergency zone that includes the chemical plant and establishing AL-1 (Emergency Response), emergency services and authorized support personnel only access protocols. The initial assessment by the plant personnel reveals minor damage onsite, but current conditions outside the plant include loss of electrical power, significant flooding, and widespread tree damage affecting local roads. Due to the widespread nature of the damage, surrounding jurisdictions activated similar access programs at the next level of access, AL-2 (Response Support).

**OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES**
1. The Chemical facility needs to send relief personnel to the facility to maintain security and augment onsite staff until recovery and facility restart operations can commence.
2. The Chemical company has activated one of its national emergency response teams to support response and recovery of the facility as the lack of power and flooding have increased the chance for dangerous chemical release. These trained and certified personnel have the experience and resources to react and respond to any potential damage or issue at the facility. They are traveling from outside the State and expect to be onsite within four hours.
3. Once the emergency zone has been stabilized, the facility staff will activate defined restart teams (including employees and contractors) to assess conditions and begin restart operations. The unexpected shutdown is a costly activity and recovery to full capability is an economic imperative for the organization and community.

**ACCESS CHALLENGES**
1. The immediate relief crew, although not local emergency response personnel, will need approval to gain access to the emergency zone. These personnel can be pre-enrolled in the local access program, selected by the chemical facility, and approved by the local jurisdiction for access.
2. Most of the company’s national emergency response team members selected for this response have been pre-enrolled in the local access program, but two members require “just-in-time” enrollment, approval, and delivery of AL-1 access tokens.
3. The programs in the surrounding jurisdictions should accept and recognize the access tokens for the company’s relief and response personnel to enable access. Since the surrounding jurisdictions have established a ‘lower’ (less restrictive) condition, if the programs interoperate, the personnel will be approved for access and transit.
4. The chemical facility team must activate their recovery/restart personnel and ensure the delivery of access tokens. These personnel will be traveling to the facility from multiple locations (home/staging area(s)) and delayed arrival of some members may affect the recovery/restart activities.
Based on actual implementation experience and lessons learned, the following is recommended:

• Local (and State) access program managers should engage and coordinate with critical infrastructure facilities, via their Governance Board, to define and plan for these types of potential response scenarios.

• Critical infrastructure facility owners and operators should enroll known ride-out, relief, response, and recovery personnel into State or local access program to facilitate situational awareness, access authorization, and issuance of access tokens, when necessary.

• Critical infrastructure owners and operators should work with the local (and State) access programs to define any ‘special’ access level requirements (e.g., HAZMAT) that may be required to support potential chemical and hazardous material spill or release scenarios.

• State and local access programs should provide mechanisms for “just-in-time” enrollment to enable access for additional personnel.

SUMMARY
Implementation of an access program can assist in strengthening a community’s emergency preparedness. State and local jurisdictions should consider adoption of a common, interoperable access and phased re-entry approach to facilitate response and recovery operations. One of the objectives of the access program should be to provide flexible and interoperable mechanisms to react to any scenario through tools and coordination amongst all affected stakeholders.

Case Study 2: Urban Utility Explosion

CHALLENGE
Coordination of access management and control within a dense urban area with substantial high-value economic assets.

SCENARIO
Within a large, highly populated urban area, a utility facility experiences a catastrophic mechanical failure resulting in a fiery explosion, loss of power, as well as significant damage to the surrounding buildings and the underlying utility infrastructure. The affected area is a five (5) by ten (10) city block area surrounding the facility.

Emergency response assets react to the incident to extinguish the fires, secure and stabilize the facility, begin search and rescue operations, and conduct an assessment of the surrounding area. The surrounding facility buildings are evacuated leaving only security and essential staff onsite. Injured persons are transported to local hospitals.

The level of damage from the explosion and threat of asbestos contamination requires the shutdown of nearby commercial and residential buildings’ heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. Local authorities utilize unified incident command to establish an emergency zone, activate their access control program, and order an evacuation of nearby businesses and residences.

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
1. The complex nature of the incident makes securing the scene and surrounding access points as quickly as possible a priority, while ensuring evacuation of non-essential personnel and local residents.

2. During the incident a number of business owners and citizens may refuse to comply with the issued evacuation order. This type of situation may create a perception that some persons were allowed to re-enter the restricted area or emergency zone, while others were not, as well as pose an uncontrolled security and safety risk to both first responders and recovery personnel.

3. Assuming the incident is an accident (i.e., not criminally or terrorism related), the focus for the utility will be to get their emergency response personnel, most likely from outside the immediate area, to the scene to support securing the facility, stabilizing operations, and assessing damage. These utility crews have specialized
training and skills to deal with the incident, but may not be easily distinguishable to checkpoint personnel enforcing the access points. Speedy access to the facility will be critical to minimize further damage and restoring operations. The utility crews can be expected onsite within hours of the incident.

4. Once the incident has been stabilized, local authorities will likely receive multiple requests for access from the surrounding commercial facilities, local business, and residents to conduct damage assessments, re-establish business operations, provide private security for their facilities, or return to their homes.

ACCESS CHALLENGES

1. The utility crews and subcontractors, although not local emergency response personnel, will need approval to gain access to the restricted area. These personnel can be pre-enrolled in the local access program, selected by the utility, and approved for access. Some individuals may require “just-in-time” enrollment, approval, and delivery of access tokens.

2. The density of the urban environment will compress the distances and transit times between the emergency zone and access perimeters, creating the potential for gridlock and congestion. The ability for the access control areas to be quickly established and communicated will facilitate smoother transit to and from the incident area.

3. The challenge of managing and tracking response and recovery personnel is increased by the complex nature of the overall incident. Personnel needed to conduct initial damage assessments, provide mutual assistance, or other specialized services may require access (e.g., buildings inspectors, HAZMAT crews, HVAC specialists). The personnel and organizations, who support these functions may not be ‘known’ to the local access program ahead of time and may require “just-in-time” access.

4. In all response and recovery activities, the logistical movement of equipment and supplies is a critical success factor. Transportation personnel (i.e., trucking) may well not be known ahead of time to the local authorities. Providing reliable access mechanisms for these personnel is crucial.

Based on actual implementation experience and lessons learned, the following is recommended:

• The local access program manager should engage local businesses and critical infrastructure stakeholders to discuss potential response scenarios and access requirements. This preparation enables the jurisdiction to activate the access program and establish geographic boundaries quickly.

• The local access program manager should engage local business, critical infrastructure facilities, and other organizations throughout the jurisdiction to encourage pre-registration and enrollment of personnel who may require access during an incident.

• The local access program should establish a mass communication approach for response and recovery personnel, as well as local residents and non-essential workers. Keeping non-approved personnel away from the incident area is as essential as facilitating access of approved personnel.

• Establish an interoperable access program to enable response and recovery personnel from outside the jurisdiction to quickly gain approval to enter.

SUMMARY

Urban settings amplify many of the issues surrounding incident management response. The sheer density of the environment and need to facilitate evacuation, secure the scene, and establish restricted areas may stress emergency response resources. Utilization of an access program that is inclusive of potential stakeholders’ access requirements may assist with community recovery, enable an orderly return of local business and residents, and aid in overcoming unforeseen challenges.
Case Study 3: Impact to Community Healthcare Resources

**CHALLENGE**
Coordination of access management and control during emergencies to secure and support critical community healthcare resources.

**SCENARIO**
A significant or geographically widespread emergency has occurred. Local authorities have established checkpoints to restrict access to the emergency zone, which encompasses several regional and local healthcare facilities. Due to the influx of patients to local hospitals, pre-existing community healthcare needs (e.g., requirements for in-home and long-term care services), and the enforcement of access control measures, the affected healthcare facilities’ operating capacities are stressed or severely strained.

Critical to the ability for a community, region, or State to successfully react and respond to an emergency, is the capability to maintain operations and community support activities provided by local hospitals. During emergencies, especially when an evacuation or restricted access is in effect, hospital environments may become over stressed, as other components of the community’s healthcare system and support structure (e.g., outpatient facilities, patient transportation companies, medical equipment and pharmaceutical suppliers, utility providers) are interrupted or unable to provide services.

In these situations, it is crucial for communities to maintain the operations of local hospitals or restore these facilities and supporting infrastructure as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, unlike many other facilities, hospitals cannot operate with limited staff and often require normal staffing levels plus augmentation personnel to achieve the level of operations necessary to support an incident. In addition, hospitals require a near-continuous flow of logistical support to meet their operational requirements.

**OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES**
1. Maintaining operations before, during, and after an incident may require additional personnel from existing hospital staff or augmentation from other medical facilities. These individuals will be going toward or into a restricted area to perform critical activities, but may not meet the expected definition of an emergency responder.
2. Hospitals require their full or nearly full staffs to operate and provide adequate levels of service. Much of the staffing fulfills support and administrative roles integral to maintaining hospital operations (e.g., laundry, janitorial, food preparation, and pharmacy personnel), without which may greatly reduce available services.
3. Hospital and State ESF-8 plans often include the steps to identify qualified and licensed augmentation staff (e.g., doctors, nurses, specialized healthcare providers, ambulatory care) to provide support to medical facilities during emergencies. These personnel may be identified after the incident and travel to the facility via their personal vehicle. Ensuring these ‘authorized’ personnel have access is critical to maintaining operations.
4. Hospitals require near continuous receipt of supplies during incidents to support the increase operating tempos and workloads. This requires the expedited entry of logistical resources and healthcare related service providers.

**ACCESS CHALLENGES**
1. Ensuring access coordination across all elements of the community’s healthcare system and support structure is key to maintaining hospital operations and providing for other community healthcare needs.
2. Ensuring the access of key personnel to maintain required staffing levels for hospitals and other essential healthcare facilities (e.g., dialysis centers) requires close integration with the local access program.
3. Providing access tokens to approved augmentation personnel, who may not be pre-registered or known to the access program.
4. Ensuring the ability to identify and support access of critical healthcare suppliers.
Based on actual implementation experience and lessons learned, the following is recommended:

- **Hospitals**, along with all the other elements of a community’s healthcare support structure, form a key lynchpin in the overall healthcare resilience posture for a community or State. Engaging at both the local and State level to incorporate a consistent and interoperable approach to support access requirements for hospitals is a recommended best practice.

- **Access program managers**, should work jointly with their local hospitals, State health and public healthcare, ESF-8 organizations, and appropriate licensing boards to establish a coordinated response process to ensure that augmentation personnel can be quickly identified, authorized, and delivered access tokens to expedited their transit and arrival to designated facilities.

- **Hospital suppliers** serve multiple communities across the country and may often re-route deliveries to affected areas to shorten the response time. The capability of local communities to react and approve access with a consistent and interoperable approach facilitates their support.

**SUMMARY**

The healthcare pyramid within the United States is ‘anchored’ by the hospital unit within local communities. The ability to maintain hospital operations during and after an emergency is critical for a community to successfully react and recover. Tight integration with the access program is a key requirement.

**Case Study 4: Impact to Community Water and Wastewater Services**

**CHALLENGE**

Coordination of access management and control during emergencies to support community water and wastewater services.

**SCENARIO**

A significant, geographically wide spread incident has occurred that has affected public drinking water and wastewater treatment operations, as well as distribution and collection systems. Local authorities have established checkpoints to restrict access to emergency zones across multiple jurisdictions, many of which contain water and wastewater utility assets that must be immediately assessed for damage or repaired to maintain water and wastewater services for critical infrastructure facilities, response and recovery operations, and public consumption requirements.

Water and wastewater services are vital to community well-being before, during and after emergencies. The loss of drinking water and wastewater services can have immediate affects to interdependent critical infrastructure sectors, such as healthcare (i.e., hospitals and nursing homes), emergency services (i.e., firefighting), as well as cascading effects on all the other critical infrastructure sectors. Disruptions in wastewater collection and treatment, such as sewage backups or treatment plant by-passes, can pose significant public health hazards, increase the cost of recovery due to sewer flooding, as well as affect receiving waters and the environment. Thus, loss of water and wastewater services, even for short durations, can severely stress a community’s ability to effectively respond to and recover from emergencies.

**OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES**

1. Public Works personnel are not often thought of as traditional first responders during emergency response and recovery efforts, which can delay water and wastewater personnel from entering restricted areas to assess damage and effect repairs.

2. Water utility assets may be dispersed across large areas, and access may be affected by flooded roadways or blocked by fallen trees or debris. In these cases, water utility response personnel may have to be augmented by additional emergency response personnel to gain access.

3. Under the National Response Framework, water and wastewater response needs are segmented into multiple Emergency Support Functions (ESF) - primarily ESF 3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF 4 (Firefighting),
ESF 6 (Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services), and ESF 8 (Public Health and Medical Services). This situation may make coordination of water responses challenging for emergency managers.

4. Water and wastewater utilities may require logistical support for delivery of treatment chemicals or fuel for generators during long-term power outages to meet operational requirements.

ACCESS CHALLENGES

1. During emergencies, water and wastewater utility personnel may need the same degree of access as other first responders to enable emergency response operations, or to maintain municipal and community lifelines. (e.g., water and wastewater utility personnel often require prompt access to damaged assets both at the treatment facility and within the distribution or collection systems [i.e., pump or lift stations, damaged water lines], even though they may not be directly involved in the lifesaving portion of the incident).

2. Local access program managers may need to coordinate access requirements with neighboring jurisdictions for water and wastewater utility assets dispersed across large areas, with additional support from State or Federal entities during large scale incidents.

3. Ensuring the ability to identify and support access of water and wastewater utility chemical suppliers, fuel delivery, and mutual assistance assets (e.g., assistance provided through EMAC) not pre-registered in the local access program or known to local authorities.

Based on actual implementation experience and lessons learned, the following is recommended:

- It is important that emergency planners engage with water and wastewater utilities in their area to better understand potential critical infrastructure interdependencies and integrate water and wastewater utility responders into access programs.

- During incidents, some water and wastewater sector mutual aid agreements, such as the Water/Wastewater Agency Response Networks (WARNs), may involve movement of resources among several jurisdictions. These mutual aid access provisions should be coordinated between water and wastewater utilities and emergency planners ahead of time.

SUMMARY

The loss of water and wastewater services can have both immediate and cascading affects to a community and interdependent critical infrastructure sectors. Loss of water and wastewater services, even for short durations, can severely stress a community or industry’s ability to effectively respond to and recover from emergencies. Close integration between water and wastewater utility staff and local jurisdiction access programs is essential to restore water and wastewater services and ensure community well-being.
# Appendix B. Phased Re-entry Access Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCESS LEVEL</th>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>ACCESS CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response</td>
<td><strong>AL-1</strong> RED</td>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong> Before, during, and immediately after emergency&lt;br&gt;<strong>Emergency Zone</strong> Area considered potentially hazardous or unstable&lt;br&gt;<strong>Authorized Access</strong> Local first responders, emergency services, and other approved emergency support personnel after visual inspection of approved forms of ID and/or access tokens&lt;br&gt;• Specific or additional access restrictions required (e.g., AL-1 [HAZMAT])&lt;br&gt;• Critical infrastructure-related personnel may require access (e.g., utility crews, public works personnel, hospital staff, etc.)&lt;br&gt;• Status of Evacuation (pending, ordered, or underway)&lt;br&gt;• Establishment of Inner or Outer Perimeter Checkpoints</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response Support</td>
<td><strong>AL-2</strong> YELLOW</td>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong> During and after emergency&lt;br&gt;<strong>Emergency Zone</strong> Area being stabilized; potential hazardous conditions may still exist&lt;br&gt;<strong>Authorized Access</strong> AL-1 support and relief assets; essential personnel to assess, protect, or initiate recovery of critical services and facilities (e.g., hospitals, utilities, critical infrastructure facilities, transportation hubs, etc.) after visual inspection of approved forms of ID and/or access tokens&lt;br&gt;• Priority to response resources needed to protect or restore essential community lifeline functions&lt;br&gt;• Safety of response personnel&lt;br&gt;• Hazards within designated restricted areas&lt;br&gt;• Status of Evacuation (pending, ordered, or underway)&lt;br&gt;• Access token required for non-marked or personal vehicles&lt;br&gt;• Location of mustering points and staging areas&lt;br&gt;• Coordination with checkpoint personnel</td>
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<td>Recovery Support</td>
<td><strong>AL-3</strong> GREEN</td>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong> After emergency&lt;br&gt;<strong>Emergency Zone</strong> Area stabilized for re-entry of repair/recovery personnel; potential hazardous areas may still exist&lt;br&gt;<strong>Authorized Access</strong> Assets that may assist with recovery efforts—not general population (e.g., retail businesses, banking and insurance providers, VOADs, etc.) after visual inspection of approved forms of ID and/or access tokens&lt;br&gt;• Priority to resources required for reestablishing essential services&lt;br&gt;• Safety of response and recovery personnel&lt;br&gt;• Spot Checks within restricted areas&lt;br&gt;• Access tokens required for non-marked or personal vehicles&lt;br&gt;• Location of mustering points and staging areas&lt;br&gt;• Coordination with checkpoint personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Return</td>
<td><strong>AL-4</strong> BLUE</td>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong> After emergency&lt;br&gt;<strong>Emergency Zone</strong> Area stable for temporary access or general re-entry by the public; basic lifeline services restored or restoration in process&lt;br&gt;<strong>Authorized Access</strong> Area open to the public; access tokens not required; all or majority of checkpoints removed&lt;br&gt;• Sufficient infrastructure to support re-entry (e.g., functioning utilities, emergency services restored, etc.)&lt;br&gt;• Any areas approved for temporary access, but not re-occupancy&lt;br&gt;• Any Jurisdictional curfew restrictions&lt;br&gt;• Any remaining hazards, response efforts, or designated restricted areas&lt;br&gt;• Any Checkpoints being maintained&lt;br&gt;• Any areas that should require photo ID and proof of residence or company affiliation</td>
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Appendix C. Sample Access Tokens

Access Tokens are intended to provide individuals requiring access to a restricted area or emergency zone a mechanism to support validation by checkpoint personnel. As access tokens represent an essential element of an overall access approach, it is recommended jurisdictions consider using standardized formats to facilitate common training for law enforcement and other checkpoint personnel.

Vehicle Placards

Vehicle Placards should be of sufficient size (8-1/2” x 11” standard U.S. letter paper) so that they can be read at distance by checkpoint personnel. This sizing facilitates both the ability to approve entry of slow moving vehicles, while providing ‘stand-off” security distance protections to checkpoint personnel.

Recommended elements include:

- Color-coded banner, including access level numeric (AL-1, 2, 3, 4) for visual identification;
- Approving (Issuing) jurisdiction’s logo – the access token should identify the jurisdictional authority under which access has been approved. For stand-alone programs this would be the local/State jurisdiction. Under the Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) Framework interoperable approach, tokens of interoperable programs would be accepted;
- Organization’s name and/or logo to identify response/recovery organization; and
- Security features – to ensure the validity of the token, jurisdictions should include security elements to prevent fraudulent creation of the access tokens.

Optional elements include:

- Electronic Validation Element – vehicle placards are intended for visual verification, but may include mechanisms to support electronic validation to verify the accuracy of the document and real-time verification of access approval status;
- Incident or Event Name – jurisdictions may designate incidents by name or code; inclusion of this information ensures that the access token is valid only for a specific incident;
- Destination – may be included to support transit of resources across large areas;
- Organization’s Name;
- Individual’s Name; and
- Emergency Support Function (ESF).

Letter of Access

Traditionally LOAs are categorized as ‘documents’ from the requesting organization (i.e., a business) on official company letterhead requesting access approval for the ‘named’ individual, or the local or State Emergency Management Agency may issue guidance requesting the LOA not only be on official letterhead, but also provide a brief explanation of the role of the personnel requiring access, or specify the critical nature of the supplies attempting to be delivered.
The challenges for checkpoint personnel are that LOAs do not often provide any mechanism for validation, enabling persons to create and pass on fraudulent requests; force the checkpoint personnel to make access decisions not knowing if the organization represented is needed within the emergency zone at the current time; and may lack a consistent format creating delays while checkpoint personnel review and decipher the documentation. It is recommended that LOAs, if utilized follow a formatted structure, and be well coordinated between the local or State Emergency Management Agency, checkpoint personnel, and private sector stakeholders.

Recommended elements include:

- Use of standard U.S. letter size paper (8-1/2” x 11”) and presented in portrait format;
- Color-coded banner, including access level numeric (AL-1, 2, 3, 4) for visual identification;
- Approving (Issuing) jurisdiction’s logo – the access token should identify the jurisdictional authority under which access has been approved. For stand-alone programs this would be the local/State jurisdiction. Under the CERRA interoperable approach, tokens of interoperable programs would be accepted;
- Organization’s name and logo to identity response/recovery organization;
- Organization’s point of contact (name and phone);
- Individual’s name; and
- Security features – to ensure the validity of the token, jurisdictions should include security features to prevent fraudulent creation of access tokens.

Optional elements include:

- Electronic validation element – LOAs are intended for visual verification, but may include mechanisms to support electronic validation to verify the accuracy of the document and real-time verification of access approval status;
- Incident or event name—jurisdictions may designate incidents by name or code; inclusion of this information ensures that the access token is valid only for a specific incident;
- Destination – may be included to support transit of resources across large areas; and
- Emergency Support Function (ESF).
Access Card

An access card refers to a physical form of identification that is typically issued pre-event or incident by a state or local jurisdiction to assist in pre-identifying specific incident management personnel, teams, or other resources (e.g. EOC, Search and Rescue, or specialized critical infrastructure response personnel). Depending on the sensitivity of an incident, incident management authorities may choose to issue separate ID cards at a staging area or reporting site to control access.

Some jurisdictions may have limited capability to produce access cards, or all the recommended elements. Access program managers should coordinate with their Emergency Management Agency to determine which elements are necessary. In addition, access program managers may wish to coordinate with critical infrastructure partners to ensure employee ID cards have sufficient information to verify identity, employment status, and as necessary professional qualifications or credentials. Through pre-coordination with the state or local EOC, some employee ID cards, along with a valid need for entry, may be sufficient to grant access.

As access cards may be used to verify identity, organizational affiliation, and approval for entry into an area or facility, jurisdictions may wish to limit the number of access cards produced to avoid potential security issues. As a best practice, due to the semi-permanent nature of access cards, it is not recommend that they be issued solely as an access document, or created in large numbers as a temporary access solution.

Recommended elements include:

- Personnel picture large enough to be seen from a reasonable distance;
- Name and Title of individual, if appropriate;
- Tamper-resistant security feature;
- Jurisdiction’s name and logo;
- Expiration date; and
- A uniform font size.

Optional elements include:

- Color-coded banner, including access level numeric (AL-1, 2, 3, 4);
- Electronic Validation Element;
- Industry Affiliation or Organizational Name;
- Issue date;
- Destination or facility;
- Emergency Support Function (ESF); and
- Event or incident name.

FEMA, DHS National Incident Management System Guideline for the Credentialing of Personnel, August 2011. Information adapted with permission for this document.
Appendix D. Resources

Access and Re-Entry Checklist

This checklist supports local planning for access and re-entry to disaster/incident areas. Local planners, in consultation with senior officials and incident management personnel, may tailor this checklist to their specific needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLANNING (PRE- AND OPERATIONAL PERIOD)</th>
<th>COMPLETED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Are leadership priorities for access and re-entry established and included into planning efforts?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Does the access plan facilitate coordination of a multi-agency approach to access and re-entry planning, operations, logistics, and safety?</td>
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<td>3. Does the access plan include processes for incidents of varying size and complexity, including those that cross-jurisdictional boundaries?</td>
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<td>4. Have organizational roles and responsibilities been incorporated into the access plan?</td>
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<td>5. Is there a cooperative forum for coordinating, implementing, and providing oversight of the access program?</td>
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<td>6. Has outreach been conducted with public sector, private sector, NGOs, and volunteer organizations to discuss scenarios that may require use of the access program, as well as discuss potential stakeholder access requirements?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Have potential checkpoint and perimeter security staffing and enforcement requirements been incorporated into the access plan?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Has the access plan been coordinated and socialized with the state emergency management agency, neighboring jurisdictions, regional response partners, and other supporting organizations (e.g. EMAC, National Guard, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Have memoranda of understanding (MOUs)/memoranda of agreement (MOAs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) been coordinated with neighboring jurisdictions, the state emergency management agency, and mutual aid partners to address access program implementation gaps?</td>
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<td>10. Does the access plan include support agency representation in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/State Operations Center (SOC)?</td>
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<td>11. Does the access plan address entry control operations for security driven incidents?</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Does the access plan address expectations for communicating access and re-entry information (e.g., alternate travel routes, status of response/recovery operations, access requirements, etc.) through media outlets, including social media, to incident management personnel, private sector stakeholders, and the public?</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Does the access plan address a process for non-first responders, private sector stakeholders, and the public to request access to restricted areas or incident sites?</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Does the access plan account for access and functional and special needs populations requirements during both the evacuation and re-entry phases of an incident?</td>
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<td>15. Have plans been validated through exercises?</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Is the access plan available on the state or local emergency management website and/or easily searchable?</td>
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### ACCESS LEVEL 1 - EMERGENCY RESPONSE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Are leadership priorities for access and re-entry established and included into emergency response efforts?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Has the types of responders needed and/or authorized access been communicated (e.g., fire, police, emergency medical services [EMS], public works and utility crews, hazardous materials [HAZMAT] response teams, search and rescue [SAR] personnel, etc.)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Have incident ingress and egress routes and access protocols been established and communicated to responders and the EOC?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Have checkpoints, perimeter security, and/or physical barriers, where possible, been established to facilitate incident security?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Have law enforcement and other checkpoint personnel been briefed on acceptable forms of identification, access tokens (e.g. vehicle placards), and other approved credentials?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Have designated responder必须ing points or staging areas been established?</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Has a liaison been designated to address access requests and concerns from private sector stakeholders (e.g. utility companies, hospitals, common carriers, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Have access requirements with neighboring jurisdictions, mutual aid resources, and/or the state emergency management agency been coordinated?</td>
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### ACCESS LEVEL 2 - RESPONSE SUPPORT

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Has an announcement been made to declare activation of Access Level 2 and which geographical areas are authorized for Response Support re-entry?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Has a liaison been designated to coordinate access requests from public and private sector stakeholders supporting protection or restoration of essential community lifeline functions (e.g. hospitals, municipal utilities, critical infrastructure facilities, common carrier logistics and transportation hubs, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Have ingress and egress routes and access protocols been established and communicated to support organizations and private sector stakeholders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Have designated mustering points or staging areas been established?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Have Response Support organizations and private sector stakeholders been informed of access requirements and which forms of identification may be required to proceed pass checkpoints (Letter of access or vehicle placard, Commercial Drivers’ License [CDL] and bill of lading, or other approved government or company-issued identification)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Have response support organizations and private sector stakeholders been informed of restricted areas and any remaining incident related hazards?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Have any curfews been established and communicated broadly?</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Have checkpoint and perimeter security personnel been briefed to allow access of approved Response Support and private sector personnel (e.g., utility crews, hospital staff, critical infrastructure response teams, transportation assets, etc.), which areas are authorized for re-entry, curfew restrictions, access requirements, acceptable forms of identification, and whom to contact if they are unsure whether to allow access?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Have checkpoint and perimeter security personnel been briefed to expect common carriers and third party logistic providers (3PLs) with essential relief supplies, what documents to examine, and whom to contact if they are unsure whether to allow access?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Does the access plan address immediate access procedures?</td>
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### ACCESS LEVEL 3 - RECOVERY SUPPORT

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<td><strong>1.</strong></td>
<td>Has an announcement been made to declare activation of Access Level 3 and which geographical areas are authorized for Recovery Support re-entry?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong></td>
<td>Has a liaison been designated to coordinate access requests from public and private sector stakeholders that may assist recovery efforts, or further enable restoration of community lifelines and essential services (e.g. retail businesses, banking and insurance providers, disaster remediation services, VOADs, etc.)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong></td>
<td>Have Recovery Support organizations and private sector stakeholders been informed of access requirements and which forms of identification may be required?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong></td>
<td>Have Recovery Support organizations and private sector stakeholders been informed of restricted areas, curfews, and any remaining incident related hazards?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong></td>
<td>Have checkpoint and perimeter security personnel been briefed to allow access of approved Recovery Support and private sector personnel, common carriers, and 3PLs, which areas are authorized for re-entry, curfew restrictions, access requirements, acceptable forms of identification, and whom to contact if they are unsure whether to allow access?</td>
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### ACCESS LEVEL 4 - GENERAL RETURN (PARTIAL OR UNRESTRICTED)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong></td>
<td>Has an announcement been made to declare activation of Access Level 4?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong></td>
<td>Have evacuation orders been cancelled and a determination made regarding which neighborhoods or geographical areas are authorized for re-entry?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong></td>
<td>Has a determination been made whether the infrastructure in the incident area is sufficient to support re-entry (e.g. functioning utilities, emergency services restored, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong></td>
<td>Are access routes passable? If not, have alternate routes been established and information disseminated through media outlets, including social media, to ensure the widest possible notification for persons transiting the area?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong></td>
<td>Have measures been established for controlling re-entry to ensure security and evacuee safety?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>6.</strong></td>
<td>Have any curfews been established or remain in effect?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>7.</strong></td>
<td>Has the return of access and functional needs populations been accounted for?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8.</strong></td>
<td>Have checkpoint and perimeter security personnel been informed of which areas are authorized for re-entry, curfew restrictions, access requirements, and acceptable forms of identification?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9.</strong></td>
<td>Have residents been informed that they can go home, and what forms of identification may be required to access their neighborhoods (driver’s license, utility bill, or other proof of residence)?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>10.</strong></td>
<td>If residents do not have a driver’s license or proof of residence, has a procedure been developed to assist them in obtaining proof of identity or an access token (e.g., a vehicle placard or letter of access issued by officials authorizing access)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11.</strong></td>
<td>Have authorities prepared preprinted information materials for returning evacuees regarding how to return safely to their homes and business?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12.</strong></td>
<td>Have call centers been established to address various needs of returning evacuees (e.g. electrical or building inspections, debris removal, mental health assistance, etc.), as well as provide information on the ongoing response/recovery operations in the impacted area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13.</strong></td>
<td>Have residents been informed (via flyers/broadcasts or some manner, including social media) that response/recovery operations may continue in or adjacent to their community even though partial or general re-entry has been authorized?</td>
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## Appendix E: Glossary

For the purpose of the Crisis Event Response and Recovery Access (CERRA) Framework, the following terms and definitions apply:

| Access | Refers to the entry to an incident scene, an incident-affected area, or the controlled or restricted roadways (transit) supporting the incident. |
| Access Authorization | Refers to the procedures and system defined by State and/or local authorities to allow access. Access Authorization, when applied in terms of attribute-based access control (ABAC), may be based upon required attributes, to include:  
  - Identification — The ability to prove identity of an individual via government-issued and/or organization-issued identification or credentials (i.e., State Driver’s License, Federal ID Card, TSA Transportation Worker Identification Credential [TWIC] card). 
  - Credentialing, or Capability — Refers to the administrative process for validating or providing, respectively, documentation that identifies personnel and authenticates and verifies the qualifications of such personnel by ensuring that such personnel possess a minimum common level of training, experience, physical and medical fitness, and capability appropriate for a specific position. 
  - Affiliation or Membership — Verifiable membership to an organization or group (i.e., an employee of Company ABC). 
  - Permission — The temporal-based approval by the responsible organization to access a restricted area or emergency zone in support of response or recovery operations. |
| Access Checkpoint | Refers to the point of access, normally managed by law enforcement, into a restricted area or emergency zone. |
| Access and Functional Needs | Refers to individual circumstances requiring assistance, accommodation, or modification for mobility, communication, transportation, safety, health maintenance, etc., due to any temporary or permanent situation that limits an individual's ability to take action in an emergency. |
| Access Program | Refers to the structured process and technology to enable access. |
| Access Token | Refers to the defined visual and electronic standards used for approval of access into a restricted area or emergency zone. These may include:  
  - Access Card — Refers to a secure physical card that is used to identify an individual’s specific qualification and organizational affiliation. 
  - Letter of Access — Refers to a paper or electronic access token that is used to identify an individual’s specific qualification(s) and grant him or her access to a restricted area or emergency zone. 
  - Vehicle Placard — Refers to a paper access token that can be used to identify that an individual(s) traveling by vehicle has been granted access to or permission to transit through a restricted area or emergency zone. |
| Business Emergency Operations Center | Refers to an organizational element, sometimes operating in support of a State emergency operations center, intended to share information and coordinate the participation and activities of businesses, non-profit and volunteer organizations, and private industry partners during disaster management efforts through public-private partnerships. |
Community Lifeline
Refers to any essential service provided by the public or private sector which a community’s activity, health, and well-being may depend (e.g., Utility systems, healthcare facilities, transportation hubs, financial institutions, public facilities).

Emergency
Refers to any incident, whether natural, technological, or human-caused, that necessitates responsive action to protect life or property.

Emergency Manager
Refers to a designated individual, or role, authorized to act with jurisdictional authority, which during an emergency is responsible for incident management at the local and/or State level. (Note: This ‘role’ may be assigned to law enforcement or fire department depending on the structure and organization of the jurisdiction.)

Emergency Zone
Refers to a geographically-defined area that is affected, or is expected to be affected, by an emergency.

Enrollment Process
Refers to the establishment of individuals within the CERRA environment. Individual records include ‘claims’ for Identifications, Affiliations (Memberships), and Credentials/Capabilities for each individual used to satisfy established access rules for entry.

Governance Board
Refers to the body or group of individuals that have oversight over a local, State, or regional access program.

Incident
An occurrence, natural or manmade, that necessitates a response to protect life or property; in this document, the word “incident” includes planned events as well as emergencies and/or disasters of all kinds and sizes.

Lifeline Functions
Refers to those functions that are essential to the operation of most critical infrastructure sectors, which include communications, energy, transportation, and water systems, among others.

Phased Re-entry
Refers to the process of managing access and re-entry into a restricted area or emergency zone, in support of response and recovery operations, by categorizing responders and other affected stakeholders into functional groups that may be prioritized for access and re-entry as an incident progresses (e.g., first responders and other incident management personnel, local business owners and utility operators, community members, etc.).

Planned Event (Event)
Refers to an incident that is a scheduled non-emergency activity (e.g., sporting event, concert, parade).

Registration Process
Refers to the process of establishing a trusted organizational entity within the CERRA environment to form ‘membership’ classes. Organizations may include public, private, NGO, and/or volunteer-based entities and form the Affiliation or Membership link that may be required for access.

Resource
Refers to an individual, vehicle, or other asset that requires access to support response or recovery activities. Resources are often commonly defined in terms of individual personnel, but can also be used to identify specific equipment or supplies involved in response or recovery efforts. (e.g., specialized equipment, logistics trailer).

Restricted Area
Refers to a geographical area within a jurisdiction in which authorized government officials have restricted access to maintain public safety or protect property.

Senior Official
The elected or appointed official (e.g., mayor, city manager) who, by statute, is responsible with implementing and administering laws, ordinances, and regulations for a jurisdiction.