UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

BlackRock, Inc. ) Docket No. EC16-77-002
its affiliated Investment Management )
Subsidiaries and Applicant Funds )

MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MOTION FOR RELIEF REGARDING BLACKROCK’S BLANKET AUTHORIZATIONS; HEARING REQUESTED BY THE STATES AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF UTAH, INDIANA, ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARKANSAS, IOWA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, OHIO, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TEXAS, AND WEST VIRGINIA

Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824b and Rule 214 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”) Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rules”),1 the States of Utah, Indiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia, by and through their Attorneys General (collectively, the “Attorneys General” or the “States”), move to intervene in the above-captioned docket number, wherein the Commission granted Applicants2 a three-year reauthorization of “blanket authorizations” (the “reauthorization”) to purchase, acquire, or take over $10 million in voting securities of any “public utility,” “electric utility company,” “transmitting utility,” or “holding company in a holding company system that includes an electric utility company or transmitting utility” as those terms are used in Section 203 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) (collectively, “FPA-covered utility”).3

1 18 C.F.R. § 385.101 et seq.
3 See BlackRock, Inc. 179 FERC ¶ 61,049 (2022) (“2022 BlackRock Order”); 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2); Request for Reauthorization and Extension of Blanket Authorizations Under Section
The States also respectfully move pursuant to Rule 212 for the Commission to exercise its ongoing authority under the 2022 BlackRock Order (1) to audit whether Applicants are in compliance with their representations and commitments in their application for reauthorization and the terms of the 2022 BlackRock Order, and (2) to issue supplemental orders and other appropriate relief, including ordering Applicants to function as passive, non-controlling investors and to cease all coordination with other asset managers and asset owners to influence control of utility operations before “purchas[ing], acquir[ing], or tak[ing] any” further securities in any FPA-covered utility. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824b(a)(2), (b), 825h. The States further request the Commission order an evidentiary hearing on this motion. If the Commission denies intervention or concludes that relief requested is not properly sought under Rules 212 and 214, then the States request in the alternative that the Commission issue an order treating this filing as a complaint under Rule 206 for violation of 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2) and proceed accordingly.

INTRODUCTION

Under the FPA, any public utility holding company seeking to acquire more than $10 million in voting securities in another utility must secure an order from the Commission authorizing it to do so. Large investment management companies like BlackRock may request advance “blanket authorizations” from the Commission to acquire prospectively such equity in FPA-covered utilities. Only if the Commission finds the transaction is consistent with the public interest in light of competition, rates, and regulation will it then approve an application for blanket authorization. The Commission historically issues blanket authorizations for three-year terms,

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requiring investment companies to re-apply for reauthorization periodically.⁷

For over a decade, BlackRock has applied for and received blanket authorizations and reauthorizations from the Commission. In its applications, BlackRock repeatedly assures the Commission that reauthorizations are warranted because BlackRock is merely a “passive” and “non-controlling investor[]”⁸—one that has never intended to “chang[e] or influenc[e] the control of the issuer” or “exercise any control over the day-to-day management or operations” of utility companies.⁹

That’s not true. Maybe BlackRock was a passive investor ten years ago, but today it’s an environmental activist. Indeed, BlackRock’s own public commitments belie its representations to the Commission. Pursuant to its membership in several horizontal associations, BlackRock aims to pressure or force utility companies to phase out traditional energy investment. The States now submit that in taking such action, BlackRock has violated § 824b(a)(2) of the FPA and the Commission’s reauthorization for two independent reasons, each of which is sufficient to warrant relief.

First, BlackRock is part of “holding companies” that have not received Commission authorization. BlackRock is a signatory to horizontal associations—including Climate Action 100+ (“CA100+”) and the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative (“NZAM”)—that have an express purpose of coordinating shareholder voting power across their members to influence the operations of FPA-covered utilities. These groups embrace targets that would force utilities to reduce their fossil fuel usage from 61% in 2020 to 25% by 2030, and to 2% by 2050. Another scenario calls

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⁸ 2022 BlackRock Application at 10-12.
for U.S. power-sector emissions to reach net zero by 2035. BlackRock and others have formally and publicly joined these associations, whose members then engage with, introduce shareholder proposals at, and vote on such proposals and directors at FPA-covered utilities to influence changes in their operations.

CA100+ and NZAM, including their signatories such as BlackRock, are “holding companies” under 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2) and (6), but the Commission has never authorized the purchase, acquisition, or taking of securities in FPA-covered utilities in relation to them. In fact, on information and belief, BlackRock has never formally disclosed its participation in these holding companies to the Commission. An “association” and “any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not,” can meet the definitions of “holding company.” 42 U.S.C. § 16451(4). CA100+ and NZAM, including their members, fit within that broad statutory language. Moreover, the Commission’s precedent rejects blanket authorization under § 824b(a)(2) for a holding company comprised of asset managers to exceed 20% ownership in FPA-covered utilities, yet the holding companies of CA100+ and NZAM, including their members, exceed that. Applicants’ reauthorization as part of a smaller holding company (BlackRock) cannot insulate them from compliance with § 824b(a)(2) as part of undisclosed larger holding companies that coordinate activities (e.g., CA100+ and NZAM)—otherwise, the percentage limits in the reauthorization would be meaningless.

In contrast to BlackRock, the Vanguard Group, Inc. (“Vanguard”) did not join CA100+, and it withdrew from NZAM in December 2022. Vanguard’s CEO recently commented, “We don’t

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believe that we should dictate company strategy.”

He also said, “It would be hubris to presume that we know the right strategy for the thousands of companies that Vanguard invests with. We just want to make sure that risks are being appropriately disclosed and that every company is playing by the rules.” He further stated, “We cannot state that [environmental, social and governance (“ESG”)] investing is better performance wise than broad index-based investing .... Our research indicates that ESG investing does not have any advantage over broad-based investing.”

Second, Applicants are not functioning as “passive, non-controlling investors,” as they represented in seeking authorization and reauthorization. The Commission’s orders have never authorized BlackRock to engage in “any activity designed to ... influence the day-to-day commercial conduct of [an FPA-covered utility’s] business,” or to “[s]eek to determine or influence whether generation, transmission, distribution or other physical assets of the Utility are made available or withheld from the marketplace; ... or [s]eek to participate in or influence any other operational decision of the Utility.” Those representations continue to bind BlackRock through its subsequent requests for reauthorization. In fact, in 2022, the Commission specifically relied on the fact that BlackRock “provided assurances sufficient to demonstrate that they will not

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11 Chris Flood et al., Vanguard chief defends decision to pull asset manager out of climate alliance, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 20, 2023), available at https://www.ft.com/content/9dab65dd-64c8-40c0-ae6e-fac4689dce77.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See 2022 BlackRock Application at 10; see also id. at 11 (stating that “the interests acquired by the Applicants would be passive”).
be able to influence control over U.S. Traded Utilities.”

The Commission should ensure that BlackRock is adhering to these limitations on “influence” regardless of whether BlackRock is filing a Schedule 13G or 13D disclosure for a particular U.S. Traded Utility. The Commission should do so as a proper exercise of its audit and supplemental order powers under the 2022 BlackRock Order. If BlackRock returns to functioning as a passive owner and withdraws from CA100+, NZAM, and other associations seeking to influence control of FPA-covered utilities, it may properly continue acquiring shares to the limits established by the Commission. Absent those corrective actions, it must not be permitted to acquire more shares in violation of § 824b(a)(2).

The relief requested in this Motion is appropriate. When issuing the reauthorization, the Commission expressly reserved its audit and supplemental order powers over BlackRock during the term of the reauthorization. The order provides: “(E) Applicants are subject to audit to determine whether they are in compliance with the representations, conditions, and requirements that the authorizations granted in this order are based on,” and “(L) The Commission retains authority under sections 203(b) and 309 of the FPA to issue supplemental orders as appropriate.”

Given the aggregation of shareholder voting power beyond the 20% limit set by the Commission

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17 2022 BlackRock Order at P 19.
18 Federal securities laws require investors to file a Schedule 13D or 13G disclosure report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) whenever any person acquires, directly or indirectly, beneficial ownership of five percent or more of any class of securities of a publicly traded company. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 et seq. A 5% investor must file a Schedule 13D with the SEC that describes its efforts or motivation to influence control of the company. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1. However, a 5% investor may file an abbreviated Schedule 13G disclosure where the “securities . . . were not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.” Id. BlackRock almost exclusively files short-form disclosures on Schedule 13G. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2099 (2019).
19 2022 BlackRock Order, at Ordering Paragraph (E), (L).
and BlackRock’s actions to influence control of companies, the Commission must exercise its ongoing authority. The States therefore respectfully move for intervention and for the Commission to exercise its audit and supplemental order authorities and to set an evidentiary hearing on this matter. In the alternative, the States respectfully move the Commission to treat this filing as a complaint and proceed accordingly.

COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Please direct all communications and correspondence regarding this proceeding to:

MELISSA A. HOLYOAK
Solicitor General
Office of the Utah Attorney General
350 N. State Street, Ste. 230
P.O. Box 142320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
(801) 538-9600
melissaholyoak@agutah.gov

THOMAS M. FISHER
Solicitor General
Office of the Indiana Attorney General
IGC-South, Fifth Floor
302 West Washington Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
(317) 232-6255
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov

EDMUND G. LACOUR JR.
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
State of Alabama
501 Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 300152
Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152
(334) 242-7300
(334) 353-8400 fax
Edmund.LaCour@AlabamaAG.gov
CORI M. MILLS  
Deputy Attorney General  
Alaska Department of Law  
P.O. Box 110300  
Juneau, AK 99811-0300  
Phone: (907) 465-3600  
Fax: (907) 465-2520  
Cori.mills@alaska.gov

NICHOLAS J. BRONNI  
Solicitor General  
Dylan L. Jacobs  
Deputy Solicitor General  
Arkansas Attorney General’s Office  
323 Center Street, Suite 200  
Little Rock, AR 72201  
(501) 682-2007  
Nicholas.Bronni@ArkansasAG.gov  
Dylan.Jacobs@ArkansasAG.gov

ERIC H. WESSAN  
Solicitor General  
Office of the Iowa Attorney General  
1305 E. Walnut Street  
Des Moines, Iowa 50319  
(515) 823-9117  
(515) 281-4209 (fax)  
eric.wessan@ag.iowa.gov

CHRISTOPHER L. THACKER  
Assistant Deputy Attorney General  
Kentucky Office of the Attorney General  
700 Capital Avenue, Suite 118  
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601  
(502) 696-5570  
Christopher.Thacker@ky.gov
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL  
Solicitor General  
Tracy Short  
Assistant Attorney General  
Louisiana Department of Justice  
1885 N. Third Street  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804  
(225) 326-6766  
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov  
shortt@ag.louisiana.gov

JUSTIN L. MATHENY  
Deputy Solicitor General  
Office of the Mississippi Attorney General  
P.O. Box 220  
Jackson, MS 39205-0220  
(601) 359-3680  
justin.matheny@ago.ms.gov

JOSH DIVINE  
Solicitor General  
Missouri Attorney General’s Office  
207 West High St.  
Jefferson City, MO 65101  
(573) 751-8870  
Josh.Divine@ago.mo.gov

CHRISTIAN CORRIGAN  
Solicitor General  
Montana Department of Justice  
215 N Sanders St  
Helena, MT 59601  
(406) 444-2026  
christian.corrigan@mt.gov

ERIC J. HAMILTON  
Solicitor General  
Office of the Nebraska Attorney General  
2115 State Capitol  
Lincoln, NE 68509  
Phone: (402) 471-2683  
Email: eric.hamilton@nebraska.gov
ARGUMENT

I. Factual and Procedural Background Relevant to the States’ Motions


The Commission originally granted BlackRock’s “blanket authorization” in 2010 for certain acquisitions of utility voting securities that would otherwise be prohibited by Section 203(a)(2) of the FPA.²⁰ By regulation, upon receipt of an application, the Commission determines whether the proposed transaction is “consistent with the public interest” in light of its possible effects on competition, rates, and regulation.²¹ Section 203(b) of the FPA authorizes the Commission to grant applications “in whole or in part and upon such terms and conditions as it finds necessary or appropriate to secure the maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the public interest.”²²

The 2010 BlackRock Order allowed BlackRock to acquire the voting securities of any FPA-covered utility, up to 20% ownership in aggregate by BlackRock and its affiliates or subsidiaries or up to 10% ownership by any individual BlackRock fund.²³ In practice, BlackRock owns billions of dollars of stock in multiple utility companies, far in excess of the limit of $10 million that is available to a holding company without some form of Commission authorization.²⁴

²⁰ See 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2); 2010 BlackRock Order.
²¹ 18 C.F.R. § 2.26(b); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(4) (setting forth general “consistent with the public interest” standard). In determining whether the proposed transaction is in the public interest, the Commission considers the possible effect on competition, rates, and regulation. 18 C.F.R. § 2.26(b); see also Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act; Policy Statement, Order No. 592, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,044 (1996).
²³ 2010 BlackRock Order at 61, 309 P 33.
The Commission granted the blanket authorizations based on Applicants’ “commit[ment] … not [to] exercise control over the day-to-day management or operations” of utilities.\textsuperscript{25} Applicants assured the Commission that their investments were merely “passive” and that they acquired voting securities in FPA-covered utility companies “in the ordinary course of . . . [their] business and not with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.”\textsuperscript{26} Applicants stated they would act in a manner that would limit them to filing Schedule 13G forms and “maintain[ed] that … any activity designed to replace the issuing company’s management or \textit{influence the day-to-day commercial conduct of its business} constitutes an attempt at control and therefore renders an acquiring person ineligible to file a Schedule 13G.”\textsuperscript{27} This was a key representation by Applicants to the Commission when obtaining initial blanket authorization in 2010.

The Commission reauthorized the blanket authorizations in 2013 based on the similar representation that “Applicants will be non-controlling, passive investors,” and Applicants were again limited to activities that would qualify for filing a Schedule 13G.\textsuperscript{28} The 2013 order makes clear that Applicants did not seek any broader authority to exercise control than what they sought and represented in 2010.

In 2016, Applicants again represented that they would be “non-controlling, passive investors.”\textsuperscript{29} They did seek broader authority to exercise control in a way that would require them to file Schedule 13D forms, but Applicants were clear that even in that scenario they would not

\textsuperscript{25} 2010 BlackRock Order at 61,306, 61,309 PP 15, 33.
\textsuperscript{27} 2010 BlackRock Order at 61,307 P 21 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{BlackRock, Inc.}, 143 FERC ¶ 62,046, 64,138 (2013) (“2013 BlackRock Order”).
\textsuperscript{29} 2016 BlackRock Order at *3.
“[s]eek to determine or influence whether generation, transmission, distribution or other physical assets of the Utility are made available or withheld from the marketplace; … or [s]eek to participate in or influence any other operational decision of the Utility.”

In 2019, Applicants told the Commission that “there have been no changes in material facts and circumstances that would alter or affect the Commission’s consideration in the prior authorization orders.”

In 2022, Applicants continued their representation to the Commission that they would function as “passive, non-controlling investors” and “the interests acquired by the Applicants would be passive.” The Commission did not hold a hearing or receive any economic evidence related to BlackRock’s application. Instead, “[b]ased on Applicants’ representations, [the Commission found] that the Reauthorization will not have an adverse effect on competition, rates, or regulation.” The Commission further rejected Public Citizen’s protest because “Applicants have provided assurances sufficient to demonstrate that they will not be able to influence control over U.S. Traded Utilities.” As with the prior orders, the 2022 BlackRock Order limited equity ownership in aggregate by BlackRock and its affiliates or subsidiaries in any utility to 20%, or up to 10% ownership by any individual BlackRock fund.

B. BlackRock Is Participating in Horizontal Associations or Organized Groups that Leverage Shares to Influence Utility Companies to Change Operations.

BlackRock’s representations in its applications that it would merely be a passive investor and not seek to “influence” control of FPA-covered utilities warrant ongoing review and action by...

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30 Id. at *2.
32 2022 BlackRock Application at 10-11.
33 2022 BlackRock Order at P 15.
34 Id. at P 19.
35 Id. at Ordering Paragraph (B).
the Commission. On information and belief, BlackRock did not inform the Commission in its 2022 application that in 2020 and 2021 it formally joined with other asset managers in associations or organized groups whose mission is to leverage shareholder voting power to influence companies to adopt “net zero by 2050.”\textsuperscript{36} This agenda includes major changes in utility operations—reducing fossil fuel usage from 61% in 2020 to 25% by 2030, and to 2% by 2050. A more recent scenario endorsed by CA100+ and other horizontal organizations calls for power-sector emissions in advanced economies (including the United States) to reach net zero by 2035.\textsuperscript{37} These associations, which collectively hold more than 20% of the equity in FPA-covered utilities, are thus coordinating to influence control over utility company operations.

1. **Climate Action 100+**

BlackRock joined CA100+ in January 2020. CA100+ is a horizontal organization of asset managers and asset owners that has approximately \$68 trillion in assets under management.\textsuperscript{38} CA100+ “has established a common high-level agenda for company engagement to achieve clear commitments to cut emissions, improve governance and strengthen climate-related financial disclosures.”\textsuperscript{39} The second prong of CA100+’s “three asks” agenda is to push target company

\textsuperscript{36} Whether BlackRock reserved the right to act independently, its membership is still part of an “association” or “any organized group or persons, whether incorporated or not,” which is the language of the statute. See 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(6); 42 U.S.C. § 16451(4). And BlackRock cannot claim it was unaware that its membership had significance. It put out a statement acknowledging that “[c]ertain types of collective action can have regulatory ramifications.” BlackRock, *Climate Action 100+ Sign-on Statement* (Jan. 6, 2020) (“BlackRock CA100+ Sign-on Statement”), available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/our-participation-in-climate-action-100.pdf.


\textsuperscript{38} CA100+, *Investor Signatories*, https://www.climateaction100.org/whos-involved/investors/.

\textsuperscript{39} CA100+, *The Three Asks*, https://www.climateaction100.org/approach/the-three-asks/.
boards and senior management to “[t]ake action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the value chain, consistent with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global average temperature increase to well below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, aiming for 1.5 degrees. Notably, this implies the need to move towards net-zero emissions by 2050 or sooner.”40 CA100+ also mandates that investors require their portfolio companies to provide enhanced corporate disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”).41

CA100+ identifies on its website 166 “focus companies,” which are “key to driving the global net zero emissions transition.”42 Signatories to CA100+ promise to evaluate whether the focus companies are “working to decarbonize [their] capital expenditures,” which requires making “a commitment to ‘green revenues’ from low carbon products and services” and planning to cut future investment and production of traditional energy sources.43 Several U.S.-based utility companies are among CA100+’s targeted “focus companies,” including: Dominion Energy, Inc.; Duke Energy Corp.; FirstEnergy Corp.; NextEra Energy, Inc.; NRG Energy, Inc.; The Southern Company; Vistra Corp.; and Xcel Energy Inc.44 The “focus companies have been selected for engagement” because according to CA100+, they represent a significant portion of industrial greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.45

40 Id.
41 Id.
42 CA100+, Companies, https://www.climateaction100.org/whos-involved/companies/.
44 See CA100+, Companies, https://www.climateaction100.org/whos-involved/companies.
45 Id.
To satisfy CA100+’s goal, focus companies must be forced to “explicitly commit[] to align future capital expenditures with the Paris Agreement’s objective of limiting global warming to 1.5 Celsius.”46 As to utility companies specifically, CA100+ asset managers urge that “[b]oth coal and gas fired generation must be phased out to achieve global net-zero emissions by mid-century.”47 Accordingly, these asset managers have agreed to collectively compel utilities to publish a “coal and natural gas-generation retirement schedule consistent with a credible climate scenario” and a “retirement date assigned to each coal or gas unit.”48

BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink stated in his 2020 Letter to CEOs—including CEOs of publicly traded utility companies—that he “believe[s] we are on the edge of a fundamental reshaping of finance.”49 Mr. Fink said BlackRock will be “increasingly disposed to vote against management and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans underlying them.”50 Mr. Fink’s 2020 letter to BlackRock clients provides, “We are asking companies to publish [Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”)]- and [Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”)]-aligned disclosures, and as expressed by the TCFD guidelines, this should include the company’s plan for operating under a scenario where the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting warming to less than two degrees is fully realized.”51

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46 CA100+ Net-Zero Company Benchmark at 3.
48 Id.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
2. Net Zero Asset Managers Initiative

BlackRock joined NZAM in 2021. NZAM is another horizontal association of asset managers that encompasses $59 trillion in assets under management. BlackRock pledged, as a member of NZAM, to “[i]mplement a stewardship and engagement strategy, with a clear escalation and voting policy, that is consistent with [its] ambition for all assets under management to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or sooner.” This commitment, by its terms, applies to “all assets under management.”

The NZAM FAQ says, “What is the reach of the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative?” The response is: “Our 273 signatories to date [i.e., at the time of the FAQ] manage over USD 61.3 trillion of assets. The transition to net zero will be the biggest transformation in economic history. The opportunities to allocate capital to this transition over the coming years cannot be underestimated. Our industry’s ability to drive the transition to net zero is extremely powerful. Without our industry on board, the goals set out in the Paris Agreement will be difficult to meet.”

As a member of NZAM, BlackRock is also part of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (“GFANZ”) because NZAM is one of the “sector-specific alliances” that comprise GFANZ. Mr. Fink, in his capacity as Chairman and CEO of BlackRock, in fact, is a member of the “GFANZ Principals Group,” which sets “strategic direction and priorities for GFANZ and monitors progress.” The United Nations described GFANZ as follows: “Over 160 firms with $70 trillion in assets have joined forces behind a common goal: steer the global economy towards net-zero

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55 Id. (footnote omitted).
56 GFANZ, About us, https://www.gfanzero.com/about/.
57 Id.
emissions and deliver the Paris Agreement goals.”58 This group is committed to “accelerat[ing] the decarbonisation of the global economy,”59

Mr. Fink’s 2021 Letter to Clients stated, “Last year we wrote to you that BlackRock was making sustainability our new standard for investing.”60 He also stated that BlackRock is “explicitly asking that all companies disclose a business plan aligned with the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C, consistent with achieving net zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.”61

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An asset manager with trillions in assets under management62 who joins with other asset managers to use tens of trillions of assets under management to influence fundamental changes in utility company operations bears no resemblance to the “passive” investor BlackRock promised to be. BlackRock recognized the regulatory concerns in joining CA100+. It specifically acknowledged that “[c]ertain types of collective action can have regulatory ramifications.”63 And, as will be shown below, the percentage of utility stock owned by the asset managers that have joined CA100+ and NZAM exceeds the 20% maximum that the Commission permits asset managers.

61 Id.
63 BlackRock CA100+ Sign-on Statement. It is unclear if BlackRock issued a similar statement when joining NZAM.
C. The Horizontal Organizations Influence Company Operations

1. CA100+’s Mission Is to Influence Utilities to Change their Operations to Reduce Fossil Fuel Usage In Alignment with Net Zero by 2050.

Simply put, CA100+ seeks to control the operations of utilities to change fossil fuel usage from 61% in 2020 to 25% by 2030, with an ultimate limit of only 2% fossil fuel usage by 2050. The change in operations CA100+ pushes relates to whether a company’s short, medium, and long-term targets are aligned with the goal of “limiting global warming to 1.5°C,” as provided for and quantified in the International Energy Agency’s (“IEA”) Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario (“NZE”), which was released in May 2021.64 This change in operations is not required to comply with applicable U.S. or state law but rather uses the power of horizontal agreements among asset managers with substantial stock holdings to coerce companies to adopt changes sought by activists.

BlackRock—consistent with joining CA100+ and NZAM—also adopted a policy seeking disclosure and targets aligned with less than 2°C of global warming. BlackRock cites the TCFD and has cited the Science Based Targets Initiative (“SBTi”). TCFD recommends that organizations “[d]escribe the resilience of their strategy, taking into consideration different climate-related scenarios, including a 2°C or lower scenario, where such information is material.”65

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BlackRock specifically encourages portfolio companies to disclose targets that are “[c]onsistent with the TCFD, … including a scenario in which global warming is limited to well below 2°C, and considering global ambitions to achieve a limit of 1.5°C.”

BlackRock previously published its Commentary specific to “Climate risk and the transition to a low-carbon economy” in February 2021 (the “2021 BIS Commentary”), which elaborated on its Global Principles for Investment Stewardship. It spelled out that BlackRock “expect[s] companies to disclose scope 1 and scope 2 emissions and accompanying GHG reduction targets,” instructed that “[c]ompanies in carbon-intensive industries should also disclose scope 3 emissions,” and stated that “[a] significant portion of the transition to a low-carbon economy hinges on the eventual retirement of fossil fuels.” The 2021 BIS Commentary further stated,

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68 2021 BIS Commentary at 3. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, Scope 1 greenhouse gas emissions “occur from the sources that are controlled or owned by an organization,” and Scope 2 emissions are indirect emissions associated with electricity, steam, heat, or cooling. [https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/scope-1-and-scope-2-inventory-guidance](https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/scope-1-and-scope-2-inventory-guidance). Scope 3 emissions are even more attenuated—they are emissions resulting from “assets not owned or controlled by the reporting organization, but that the organization indirectly affects in its value chain.” [https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/scope-3-inventory-guidance](https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/scope-3-inventory-guidance).
“Industry bodies, such as the [SBTi] provide guidance and assurance processes for companies to set targets aligned with less than 2° C of warming and to track milestones.”\textsuperscript{69} The 2022 BlackRock Commentary also points portfolio companies to STBi.\textsuperscript{70} BlackRock’s engagement and voting arm has thus pointed companies to TCFD and SBTi guidance to describe what carbon reduction goals it expects.

The SBTi publication \textit{Pathways to Net-Zero: SBTi Technical Summary} explains that “[m]itigation pathways play a key role in setting science-based targets (SBTs).”\textsuperscript{71} Under the heading “How does the SBTi determine 1.5°C-aligned pathways?,” SBTi—like CA100+—cites the IEA \textit{“Net-Zero Roadmap”} as one of two key studies that “define the upper bound of sectoral carbon budgets that must not be exceeded by target-setting pathways.”\textsuperscript{72}

SBTi describes the \textit{Net-Zero Roadmap} as one of the “studies [that] have undergone rigorous peer review, incorporate detailed sectoral considerations, and utilize recent historical data.”\textsuperscript{73} SBTi further provides: “Companies in the power generation sector . . . are required to set SBTs using sector-specific pathways.”\textsuperscript{74} To establish “emissions corridors for energy and industrial process CO2 emissions,” SBTi again relies on studies, including “NZE, which is the main scenario from the IEA (2021), Net-Zero Roadmap.”\textsuperscript{75} SBTi—like CA100+—thus uses the IEA \textit{Net-Zero Roadmap} as one of the “studies [that] have undergone rigorous peer review, incorporate detailed sectoral considerations, and utilize recent historical data.”\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[69]{2021 BIS Commentary at 3.}
\footnotetext[72]{\textit{Id.} at 4-5.}
\footnotetext[73]{\textit{Id.} at 5.}
\footnotetext[74]{\textit{Id.} at 6.}
\footnotetext[75]{\textit{Id.} at 7.}
\end{footnotes}
**Roadmap**, and specifically NZE, as a reliable indicator of what changes they demand from the power-generation sector.

The *Net-Zero Roadmap* in turn explains that NZE refers to the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.\(^7^6\) Annex A of the report then provides “projected data for the [NZE] scenario,” and “Table A.3: Electricity” shows Electricity Generation Shares (%) for all fossil fuels **being cut from 61% in 2020 to 26% by 2030 and to 2% by 2050.**\(^7^7\)

### Table A.3: Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Electricity Generation (TWh)</th>
<th>Shares (%)</th>
<th>CAAGR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total generation</strong></td>
<td>26,922</td>
<td>26,778</td>
<td>37,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Renewables</strong></td>
<td>7,153</td>
<td>7,660</td>
<td>22,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar PV</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>6,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind</td>
<td>1,423</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>8,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>4,418</td>
<td>5,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bioenergy</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which BECCS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geothermal</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>3,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen-based</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil fuels with CCUS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal with CCUS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas with CCUS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unabated fossil fuels</strong></td>
<td>16,941</td>
<td>16,382</td>
<td>9,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>9,832</td>
<td>9,426</td>
<td>2,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td>6,314</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>6,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^7^6\) *Net-Zero Roadmap* at 31.

\(^7^7\) *Id.* at 193, 198. These figures are obtained by adding and comparing the columns for “Fossil fuels with CCUS” and “Unabated fossil fuels” for 2020, 2030, and 2050 under “Shares (%).” “CCUS” refers to carbon capture, utilization, and storage.
CA100+ itself indicated last year that it wants to see “coal-fired power … phased out in advanced economies by 2030,” citing specifically to “the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 roadmap.”

CA100+ also indicated that it wants “utility companies” to “add[] renewables and other low-carbon technologies fast enough to limit global warming to 1.5°C.”

Another report from last year that was endorsed by CA100+ and other horizontal organizations “brings forward the date by which power sector emissions need to reach net zero in advanced economies from 2040 to 2035.” It then states, “[t]he report will now be used by investors that are engaging with power companies on the [CA100+] focus list, through sector-wide dialogue that encourages collaborative action and as part of individual engagements.”

Showing how central these goals are to CA100+’s members, the report states that “[p]ower is arguably the most important sector to decarbonise over the next decade.” The report states, “[t]hese actions should include an immediate halt to the construction of coal-fired power plants, the phase out of coal in line with the timelines proposed by [the Powering Past Coal Alliance] and IEA NZE, and the scaling up of investments in clean energy sources and infrastructure. It is also vital to ensure full accountability of boards of directors to ensure that governance, targets, and disclosures are

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79 Id.

80 CA100+ Global Sector Strategies Report at 2. Advanced economies are OECD countries, which includes the United States.

81 Id.

82 Id. at 6.
provided, in line with the Climate Action 100+ Benchmark, to allow shareholders and stakeholders to track progress.”\(^83\)

With respect to influencing utility operations, the report specifically outlines that “Power companies should align their capital investment (capex) plans to a 1.5\(^0\)C pathway by: Not investing in any new coal generation” and “Committing to ensure that any new natural gas generation will be net zero by 2040 (2035 in advanced economies).”\(^84\) It provides a case study of American Electric Power, for which the report states: “AEP’s current net zero goal by 2050 is not yet consistent with the 2035 timeline for advanced economies set by the IEA in its NZE scenario” and further that “[t]ens of billions of dollars in capital investments will be needed for new, clean energy infrastructure.”\(^85\)

These reports show the fundamental changes that asset managers like BlackRock are seeking as part of their horizontal agreements to use their shares to influence control of utilities. Participation in horizontal agreements involving tens of trillions in assets under management to force such change in utility operations on a timeframe that is not required by applicable federal and state law is not consistent with being a “passive” investor that does not seek to “influence” operations.

2. Engagement and Voting by CA100+ Members Has Led to Utility Pledges to Change Operations.

CA100+ states that when it “launched at the end of 2017, only five focus companies had set net zero commitments. Investor engagement through the initiative has played a significant role in accelerating the net zero journey of focus companies, particularly around its three engagement goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions, improving climate governance, and strengthening

\(^83\) Id.
\(^84\) Id. at 13.
\(^85\) Id. at 30.
climate-related financial disclosures.”86 CA100+ cites to research from BloombergNEF in September 2021, which showed the increase in net-zero commitments from CA100+ “focus companies.”87

![Figure 1: Net-zero commitments and emissions addressed under targets for Climate Action 100+ focus companies](image)

Source: BloombergNEF, Climate Action 100+, Bloomberg Terminal. Note: Emissions are based on the portion of a company’s carbon footprint that is included in the net-zero target.

Of particular note here, BlackRock’s participation in CA100+ overlapped with a steep increase in emissions commitments for net zero. The BloombergNEF article continues by reporting that “[a]longside investor pressure, these targets have also been influenced by decarbonization targets set by the oil majors’ major customers. … Utilities (2.3GtCO2e), materials companies (2.2GtCO2e) and manufacturing (1.4GtCO2e) are the next largest sectors set to reduce their emissions. Utilities in particular have cut their emissions in recent years as they’ve integrated more


clean energy into their generation portfolios.”88 The article concludes: “Investor pressure is a huge driver in the corporate race to net zero. … [CA100+] consists of over 600 investors that are working with their portfolio companies to cut emissions and improve climate reporting. They are specifically taking aim at the 167 focus companies.”89

Senior leadership of CA100+ has stated outright that the purpose of CA100+ is coordinated, horizontal action by shareholders across companies to force operational changes. The vice-chair of CA100+’s “global Steering Committee,” Stephanie Pfeifer, stated that “[t]he Climate Action 100+ initiative has shown that investors can influence companies through meaningful engagement and good stewardship.”90 And Simiso Nzima, who is a member of the Steering Committee, said, “We will continue to use the power of collaborative engagements and proxy voting to drive action at our portfolio companies to align their climate ambitions with their long-term strategies and capital allocation decisions.”91 Ceres Investor Network CEO Mindy Lubber, who is also a member of the CA100+ global Steering Committee, stated, “Companies must ratchet up their climate ambition and action, and as we head into this year’s U.S. proxy season, investors will continue to use the results of the Climate Action 100+ Net Zero Company Benchmark to strengthen their own engagement and voting strategies.”92

3. BlackRock’s Own Actions Are Consistent with the CA100+ and NZAM Mission to Influence Companies to Adopt Net Zero Targets.

In the second half of 2020, after joining CA100+, BlackRock supported 54% of all environmental and social proposals, up from about 10% of such proposals prior to the 2020 proxy

88 Id.
89 Id.
90 CA100+ 2022 Benchmark Increase Statement.
91 Id.
92 Id.
season. This represents a five-fold increase in support of activist proposals by BlackRock since joining CA100+. BlackRock touted that it not only took voting action against 69 companies but also put 191 companies “on watch,” warning that such “on watch” companies face risk of ongoing voting action unless they make progress on their “transition plans to a net zero economy.”

BlackRock appears to have made good on CA100+’s “asks” and NZAM’s requisite commitments by integrating environmental ideology into its investment decisions, voting strategies, and engagement priorities. During the 2020–2021 proxy season, BlackRock held over 2,300 company “engagements” on environmental issues with its portfolio companies. BlackRock’s corporate materials do not specify the precise nature or results of such engagements, which include off-the-record conversations and closed-door meetings in which BlackRock communicates its environmental prerogatives. The Ceres Investor Network recently boasted that its investors (of which BlackRock is the largest) had reached a “[r]ecord number of negotiated agreements” in exchange for resolution withdrawals, including agreements by electric utilities “to set targets for reducing Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions.” In sum, it appears that BlackRock is using corporate-engagement strategies to pressure utilities to conform their business operations to align with BlackRock’s net-zero goals.

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94 Fink 2021 Client Letter.
BlackRock’s engagement strategies are likely successful because companies know that BlackRock has and will vote its massive shareholdings against companies for failure to align with certain environmental objectives. In the 2020–2021 proxy season, BlackRock took voting action against seven utility companies “for lack of progress on climate.”97 Some of these voting actions were directed at American utility companies including Allete, Inc., the Atlantic Power Corporation, and the National Fuel Gas Company.98 Although BlackRock does not always divulge the reasons behind its votes with respect to American companies, it loudly broadcasts the use of its voting power to punish utilities generally. For example, BlackRock voted against the board of a Korean utility to “hold[] them accountable for the decision to proceed with investing in a coal-fired power plant project in Indonesia.”99

Moreover, in 2021, BlackRock voted against the Chairman of the Board of FirstEnergy, an Ohio-based electric utility that is a CA100+ focus company because the company “does not have a rigorous net zero strategy.”100 BlackRock also voted in 2021 against a director for Dominion Energy—another CA100+ focus company—because the company did not meet BlackRock’s “expectations of having adequate climate risk disclosures against all 4 pillars of TCFD at this time, including Scope 3 disclosures.”101 The CA100+ “case study” of Dominion below shows how a

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98 Id.
101 See id. (search for “Dominion Energy”).
single director vote like this can then force the company to take further actions to avoid the pain of other adverse votes.

In February 2022, another arm of BlackRock produced a white paper, titled *Managing the Net-Zero Transition*, that illustrates exactly how asset owners “drive” the “net-zero transition.”

BlackRock, as an asset manager and the proxy for those who invest their money through it, falls within the “Asset owners” box. By BlackRock’s own analysis “some [asset owners] will help drive the net-zero transition “through decarbonization investments or invent it by creating or funding new technologies.” The actions by BlackRock discussed above fit within this definition.

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103 Id.
of “driv[ing]” the net zero transition by forcing decarbonization capital allocation decisions by utilities.

D. The Horizontal Organizations BlackRock Joined Plan to Continue Influencing Company Operations

1. CA100+ Has A Specific Goal In “Phase 2” to Influence Companies to Make Good on the Pledges Secured in “Phase 1”.

CA100+ has explained that under “Phase 1” of its initiative, which is ongoing until mid-2023, it has produced “Global Sector Strategy reports” for industries including electric utilities.104 “These have contributed to the establishment of investor-led working groups focused on implementing key actions required for these sectors to transition to net zero.”105 With respect to the electric utility sector strategy, CA100+ states that “[t]he electricity sector is responsible for 40% of global emissions, more than any other sector, and demand is predicted to grow by over 166% by 2050. In order to align with the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 scenario, emissions from electricity generation need to reach net zero by 2040 globally and by 2035 in advanced economies.”106

CA100+ included a case study of Dominion Energy, which as discussed above is a CA100+ focus company that BlackRock took voting action against in 2021.107 CA100+ states: “Following years of sustained dialogue and in response to multiple shareholder proposals, Dominion Energy made important progress in 2022: … Capital Expenditure Plan: Dominion has explicitly linked its capital investment plan and net zero goal. In addition, the company identified a $73 billion

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105 Id.
107 CA100+ Progress Update at 22.
investment opportunity by 2035, focused on building zero-carbon generation, energy storage and upgrading the electric grid.”

CA100+ also included a case study of Duke Energy, another CA100+ focus company, and specifically took credit for operational changes pushed by CA100+ engagement. CA100+ noted that in February 2022, Duke “expanded its net zero by 2050 target to include indirect emissions from the procurement of fossil fuels used for generation, the electricity purchased for its own use, the methane and carbon from production of natural gas, and the carbon emissions from customers’ consumption,” and that Duke “committed to exiting coal by 2035 and reducing the amount of power the company produces from coal to just 5% of generation by 2030.”

Dan Bakal, who works at Ceres, explained that “[t]hrough [CA100+], investors have engaged with Duke to increase the ambition and scope of their climate commitments.”

CA100+ has also explained its future plans, which show its members will continue to function as “active” rather than “passive” investors. CA100+’s focus appears to be to coerce all electric utilities into shifting at a rapid pace to non-fossil fuel generation assets. CA100+ stated that “the encouraging uptake of net zero commitments is not matched by the development and implementation of credible decarbonisation strategies. As a priority, investors need to see corporates outlining the practical actions on how they will begin to meet their net zero commitments.”

CA100+ has also explained that in “Phase 2” of its initiative, which is scheduled to begin this year, “[t]he initiative will double down on the requirement for robust transition plans

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108 Id. (emphasis added).
110 Id.
111 CA100+ Net Zero Benchmark Shows Continued Progress.
aligned with the Paris Agreement. It will also focus on deeper engagement by investor signatories to dismantle the barriers, and maximise the opportunities, that each sector encounters.” CA100+ has also stated that “[a] step change is still needed in the build out of low carbon technologies by electric utility as well as automotive focus companies. Analysis by the Rocky Mountain Institute using the [Paris Agreement Capital Transition Assessment] methodology shows that 94% of electric utility focus companies do not plan to build out sufficient renewable energy capacity and are on a >2.7°C global warming pathway for the next 5 years.”

In other words, CA100+ has been clear that it is targeting utilities to change and accelerate their capital expenditures toward non-fossil-fuel-based generation, and that it intends to ratchet up the pressure further through “engagements” by its members. This clearly has an impact on utility operations and rates. And when it is coordinated by shareholders who own shares in many different utilities—such as CA100+ and NZAM—it also has the clear potential to impact competition.

2. Coordinated Engagements Have Also Influenced Changes in Operations and the Ongoing 2023 Proxy Season Shows Shareholder Proposals Targeted at Natural Gas and Scope 3 Emissions.

The company commitments secured by CA100+ and overarching Phase 2 goals are not the only indicator of a very heavy collective thumb on the scale to influence utility operations; there is also evidence of coordinated engagement by lead investors as well as “engagement service providers.”

One noteworthy CA100+ “engagement service provider” is As You Sow. As You Sow reports that in 2021 it was able to extract agreements from multiple utility companies, some of

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113 CA100+ Net Zero Benchmark Shows Continued Progress.

which are CA100+ focus companies. It reported that Southern Company “agreed to work with As You Sow over the coming year to evaluate methodologies for estimating upstream emissions from natural gas with the aim of enhancing its disclosures.”115 Duke Energy similarly reached agreement with As You Sow in return for withdrawal of a shareholder proposal to “[m]easure and disclosure upstream GHG emissions associated with its natural gas supplies.”116 Finally, DTE Energy “agreed to work with As You Sow to address concerns regarding natural gas use and the possibility of supporting electrification.”117

In 2022, As You Sow also was able to obtain commitments from CA100+ focus companies Dominion Energy, Duke Energy, and Southern Company.118 These commitments were in exchange for withdrawal of shareholder proposals. For example, one proposal sought to compel Dominion to “revise its net zero by 2050 target, and any relevant interim targets, to integrate Scope 3 value chain emissions consistent with guidelines such as the CA100+ and SBTi, or publish an explanation of why the Company does not view inclusion of those emissions as appropriate.”119

119 As You Sow Dominion Energy Resolution.
The Duke and Southern Company proposals—both of which were also withdrawn based on commitments from the companies—are in accord.

With respect to Southern Company, As You Sow explained the 2022 agreement: “Southern Company has committed to improve GHG disclosures through disclosing its upstream Scope 3 natural gas emissions . . . in 2022, discussing ways to improve methane calculation and disclosure frameworks for the natural gas value chain with the UN Oil & Gas Methane Partnership, and sharing the results and methodology of its study analyzing emission reduction pathways for its natural gas business with As You Sow and other stakeholders.”

With respect to Dominion: “Dominion announced it will incorporate emissions from the upstream fuel consumed by the Company for its power and gas distribution businesses. It will also include information on carbon dioxide emissions associated with the production of power purchased for resale and emissions from downstream customer use of natural gas products from its local natural gas distribution business.”

With respect to Duke Energy: “Duke Energy agreed to increase the greenhouse emissions captured in its Net Zero by 2050 greenhouse gas reduction target by including upstream methane leakage from natural gas production, customer use emissions, and purchased power emissions.”

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121 Id. at 14.
122 Id.
And for the 2023 proxy season, As You Sow (backed by Climate Action 100+’s weight) already obtained commitments from at least ten companies related to resolutions it filed seeking GHG reduction targets, including Scope 3 targets.123 No vote was required.

Significantly, one of the commitments obtained in 2023 is from Ameren, in exchange for As You Sow withdrawing a proposal seeking to compel the company’s Board to “issue short and long-term targets aligned with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C goal requiring Net Zero emissions by 2050 for the full range of its Scope 3 value chain GHG emissions.”124 As You Sow has filed an identical shareholder resolution for 2023 involving Southern Company,125 and a similar proposal involving CenterPoint.126 It bears emphasis that these proposals thus seek “short-term” targets for Scope 3 emissions—the broadest category of emissions.

On March 27, 2023, CA100+ began listing “2023 Flagged Votes” and “2023 Withdrawals for Agreement” on its website.127 It notes that there have been three withdrawals related to “greenhouse gas targets” and three withdrawals related to “climate lobbying.” The “flagged votes” include two proposals related to Berkshire Hathaway—for the company to “[a]dopt board

123 See Ceres, Engagement Tracker, https://engagements.ceres.org/ (filter “By Status” for “Withdrawn: Commitment” and “By Filer” for “As You Sow”). As of March 22, 2023, these companies are Ameren Corporation, Choice Hotels International, Cleveland Cliffs, Deere & Company, Dollar Tree, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Mueller Industries, Olympic Steel, Ryerson Holding Corp, and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation.

124 Ceres, Adopt Scope 3 GHG targets (1.5C aligned) (AEE, 2023 Resolution) (“Ameren 2023 Resolution”), https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l5c00000Vt8DBAAZ.

125 Ceres, Adopt Scope 3 GHG targets (1.5C aligned) (SO, 2023 Resolution), https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l5c00000Vt8K7AAJ.

126 Ceres, Adopt Scope 3 GHG targets (1.5C aligned) (CNP, 2023 Resolution), https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l5c00000Vt8ETAAZ.

127 CA100+, Proxy Season & Flagged Shareholder Votes, https://www.climateaction100.org/approach/proxy-season/
oversight of material sustainability issue(s)” and “[r]eport on physical and transition risks and
opportunities.”

Because many of these proposals never go to a vote, even if BlackRock does not ultimately
vote yes on them, its continued involvement as a signatory to CA100+ still impacts company action
because it lends support (through the horizontal agreement to join CA100+) to As You Sow and
other CA100+ participants’ ability to negotiate concessions that affect company operations.
BlackRock is one of the largest shareholders in many American utilities and has vowed to vote
against directors if their companies do not provide “scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions disclosures and
meaningful short-, medium-, and long-term targets,” so any effort that carries the weight of
BlackRock’s shares must be taken seriously by utilities. Moreover, companies must take into
account the downside of a vote even if the vote does not get majority support. For example, proxy
advisory firms will recommend voting against directors who do not “respond” even to losing
shareholder resolutions. Glass Lewis says as little as 20% support for a shareholder proposal that
management opposes should warrant “engage[ment] with shareholders [to] demonstrate some
initial level of responsiveness.”

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128 Id. (capitalization omitted). The CA100+ website links to these proposals: Ceres, Adopt board
oversight of material sustainability issue(s) (BRK.A, 2023 Resolutio,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l5c00000JKCrpAAH;
Ceres, Report on physical and transition risks and opportunities (BRK.A, 2023 Resolutio
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l5c00000JKCrG
AAX.
129 CA100+, Proxy Season & Flagged Shareholder Votes, https://www.climateaction100.org/approach/proxy-season/.
130 BlackRock, 2022 climate-related shareholder proposals more prescriptive than 2021 2 (May
2022), available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/commentary-bis-
approach-shareholder-proposals.pdf.
E. Asset Managers (including BlackRock) Who Are Members of CA100+ and NZAM Collectively Own More than 20% of Utilities that Are Subject to Recent Shareholder Proposals

As noted above, the 2022 BlackRock Order limited equity ownership in aggregate by BlackRock and its affiliates or subsidiaries in any utility to 20%, or up to 10% ownership by any individual BlackRock fund.\(^\text{132}\) However, BlackRock and the other asset managers who are members of CA100+, NZAM, or both, collectively hold greater than 20% of the shares in utility companies that are under FERC’s jurisdiction. The examples below show that these associations or organized groups, as “holding companies,” require authorization to hold greater than 20% of the shares in FPA-covered utilities, which is in excess of the Commission’s precedent for asset managers.

**FirstEnergy:** FirstEnergy is an Ohio-based electric utility and a CA100+ focus company. In 2021 BlackRock voted against the Chairman of the Board for FirstEnergy because the company “does not have a rigorous net zero strategy.”\(^\text{133}\) FirstEnergy sells electricity wholesale on the PJM [electricity market], which is the subject of FERC’s jurisdiction.\(^\text{134}\)

More than 20% of FirstEnergy’s shares appear to be held by just five asset managers who themselves (or their affiliates) are presently signatories to CA100+ and NZAM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Percentage Ownership(^\text{135})</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{132}\) 2022 BlackRock Order at Ordering Paragraph (B).
Invesco (Invesco Ltd. & Invesco Capital Management) 2.26%  Member of CA100+ and NZAM
Wellington Management Group 1.85%  Member of CA100+ and NZAM
Legal & General Investment Management Limited 0.99%  Member of CA100+ and NZAM

**Total** 20.61%

This shows that the 20% maximum in the Commission’s blanket authorization orders is exceeded by the agreement of just five large asset managers through organizations such as CA100+. Another source shows that BlackRock’s shares are worth $1.4B, and it recently has increased its ownership share in the utility.\(^{136}\)

Moreover, more than 20% of FirstEnergy’s shares are held by as few as four current members of NZAM. Adding Vanguard, which was a signatory to NZAM until late last year, increases the ownership by five asset managers to almost 33%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Percentage Ownership(^{137})</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Vanguard Group</td>
<td>11.66%</td>
<td>Former member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Rowe Price</td>
<td>3.44%</td>
<td>Member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invesco (Invesco Ltd. &amp; Invesco Capital Management)</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (excluding Vanguard)</strong></td>
<td>21.21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (including Vanguard)</strong></td>
<td>32.87%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ameren:** Ameren is a Missouri-based electric utility. Part of Ameren’s overall business consists of selling electricity through the MISO market and wholesale bilateral agreements, which are the subject of FERC’s jurisdiction.\(^{138}\) Ameren recently made a commitment to As You Sow in

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\(^{138}\) See Ameren, 2022 Form 10-K 10, 103, 106 (Feb. 21, 2023), available at [https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001002910/65fe34c4-aeb2-4942-90af-17207c3d8f2e.pdf](https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001002910/65fe34c4-aeb2-4942-90af-17207c3d8f2e.pdf).
return for withdrawal of a shareholder proposal seeking to compel the company’s Board to “issue short and long-term targets aligned with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C goal requiring Net Zero emissions by 2050 for the full range of its Scope 3 value chain GHG emissions.”\(^\text{139}\) Moreover, Ameren Missouri has several natural gas or oil-fired facilities.\(^\text{140}\) Therefore, the shareholder proposal offered by As You Sow, which Ameren agreed to resolve in return for withdrawal, could affect these facilities, the cost to generate electricity, and Ameren’s competition with other electric utilities on the wholesale market.

More than 20% of Ameren’s shares appear to be held by just three asset managers who themselves (or their affiliates) are presently signatories to CA100+ or NZAM. Adding Vanguard increases the ownership by just four asset managers to over 33%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Percentage Ownership(^\text{141})</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Vanguard Group</td>
<td>11.53%</td>
<td>Former member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Rowe Price (T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc., and T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc.)</td>
<td>11.03%</td>
<td>Member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock</td>
<td>5.45%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
<td>5.36%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (excluding Vanguard)</strong></td>
<td>21.84%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (including Vanguard)</strong></td>
<td>33.37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shows that the 20% maximum in the Commission’s blanket authorization orders is exceeded by the agreement of just three large asset managers through organizations such as NZAM. BlackRock’s shares are valued at $1.2B, and it has increased its holdings in Ameren by 4.11%.\(^\text{142}\)

\(^\text{139}\) Ameren 2023 Resolution.
\(^\text{142}\) Id.
Southern Company: Southern is a Georgia-based utility and CA100+ focus company that has entered into agreements with As You Sow in 2021 and 2022 to avoid shareholder proposals related to natural gas emissions, including Scope 3 emissions. Southern faces another proposal from As You Sow in the 2023 proxy season also related to Scope 3 emissions, which seeks to force the company to take further action to comply with CA100+’s climate standards. Southern sells electrical power on the wholesale market and is subject to FERC jurisdiction. For example, Plant Franklin\(^\text{143}\) and Plant Harris\(^\text{144}\) in Alabama are both natural gas-fueled generating plants that sell wholesale power. Therefore, the shareholder proposal offered by As You Sow could affect these facilities, the cost to generate electricity, and the wholesale market in Alabama.

More than 20% of Southern’s shares appear to be held by just five asset managers who themselves (or their affiliates) are presently signatories to CA100+ or NZAM. Adding Vanguard increases the ownership by six asset managers to almost 30%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Percentage Ownership(^\text{145})</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Vanguard Group</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
<td>Former member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock Fund Advisers</td>
<td>5.64%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
<td>Member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Financial Services Co.</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
<td>Member of NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Resources (Franklin Advisers, Inc.)</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>Member of CA100+ and NZAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (excluding Vanguard)</strong></td>
<td>20.93%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (including Vanguard)</strong></td>
<td>29.47%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


This shows that the 20% maximum in the Commission’s blanket authorization orders is exceeded by the agreement of just five large asset managers through organizations such as NZAM. BlackRock’s current interest is valued at $4.3B, and it has increased its holdings in Southern Company by 9.6%.  

F. Since Receiving the 2022 Authorization, BlackRock Has Continued to Acquire More Stock in Utility Companies.

The facts discussed above bear directly on BlackRock’s reauthorization and the relief sought by the States because BlackRock continues “purchas[ing], acquir[ing], or tak[ing] any” further securities in excess of $10 million in an entity covered by FPA Section 203. See 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2). BlackRock CEO Larry Fink issued his latest annual letter on or about March 15, 2023. That letter reports that BlackRock “manage[d] nearly $400 billion in long-term net new assets— including $230 billion in the U.S. alone.” The sources showing ownership of the three utility companies described above (FirstEnergy, Ameren, and Southern Company) also show BlackRock owning over $1 billion in each company (far more than the $10 million standard exception) and continuing to increase its percentage of ownership. BlackRock is using the Commission’s authorization to purchase additional assets in utilities under the FPA.

II. The States’ Motion to Intervene Should Be Granted

A. The States’ Position and Basis for Intervening

Pursuant to Rule 214, the States respectfully request leave to intervene in this proceeding. BlackRock has vowed to pursue investment strategies that raise serious questions of public policy and call into doubt BlackRock’s representations to this Commission. Indeed, BlackRock has apparently breached its representations and disclaimers under the blanket authorizations to be a

146 Id.
“passive investor” and not to influence control of the day-to-day management or operations of utilities. As demonstrated by BlackRock’s own pledges to horizontal organizations of asset managers, corporate engagements, and voting record, BlackRock has indeed sought to exercise control of utilities by pressuring them to conform to ideological environmental pursuits related to net zero.

B. The States’ Interest in Intervening

The Attorneys General represent the interests of the States as well as individuals and entities residing therein who consume electricity or are otherwise affected by the Commission’s decision on BlackRock’s Application. Intervention is proper here because the Attorneys General both “represent[] an interest which may be directly affected by the outcome of the proceeding” and because their participation would be in the public interest.148 The Attorneys General are public officers charged with various statutory duties related to representing their States.149 The Commission’s 2022 order extending blanket authorizations to BlackRock may directly affect the interests of everyday consumers and other ratepayers in the States whose rates or reliability of electricity supply may be adversely affected, as well as other participants in the States. Multiple investor-owned utilities serve residents of the States that are joining this Motion. If these utilities’ services became less reliable, or costs increased, then consumers in the States would necessarily be harmed.

BlackRock itself has admitted that the transition to net zero that it is advocating will result in a “rise in inflation” and “can introduce inflationary pressures.”150 While BlackRock believes its approach is “manageable” and overall preferable, its concession regarding inflation nonetheless

148 See 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(2).
149 See generally Ind. Code § 4-6-1-6; Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1.
150 Managing the Net-Zero Transition at 2; Climate-Related Risk and the Energy Transition at 1.
admits harm to the States and their citizens. The States have suffered an injury that is a proper basis for intervention.

For example, PacifiCorp, which serves Utah, is owned by Berkshire Hathaway Energy, which is owned by Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Berkshire). In 2021, “Blackrock voted for two shareholder proposals requiring Berkshire Hathaway Inc. to issue disclosures addressing how the company is managing climate risk, noting that the company ‘is not adapting to a world where environmental, social, governance (ESG) considerations are becoming much more material to performance.’”151 “Though neither proposal was approved, Blackrock’s dissatisfaction prompted other institutional investors to express their discontent, increasing pressure on the company to modify its approach.”152 Berkshire Hathaway’s website shows that currently 20% of PacifiCorp’s energy comes from coal or natural gas generation. https://brkenergy.com/esa-
sustainability/environmental. In Utah, this includes the Currant Creek, Hunter, and Huntington facilities. https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/thermal.html. Consumers in Utah would be harmed if their costs went up because of closure of these facilities or substitution of more expensive energy sources.

Indiana is similarly served by multiple investor-owned utilities, whose ultimate parent companies are publicly traded.153 These include Northern Indiana Public Service Company, (NIPSCO), which is a subsidiary of NiSource; Indiana-Michigan Power (I&M), which is a

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152 Id.
153 https://www.in.gov/oed/indianas-energy-landscape/electricity/investor-owned-utilities/.
subsidiary of American Electric Power; Duke Energy, which is a subsidiary of Duke Energy Corporation; Indianapolis Power & Light (IPL), which is a subsidiary of AES Corporation; and Vectren, which is a subsidiary of CenterPoint Energy. These companies presently supply consumers with energy generated from coal and natural gas. Consumers in Indiana would be harmed if their costs went up because of closure of these facilities or substitution to more expensive energy sources.

Alabama is served by the Alabama Power Company, which is a subsidiary of the Southern Company. The Southern Company is a publicly traded company and a Climate Action 100+ focus company.

In addition, BlackRock is Avista’s largest shareholder, owning 18% of shares outstanding.\textsuperscript{156}

Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas are similarly served by subsidiaries of Entergy Corporation. https://www.entergy.com/residential/. Arkansas is served by Entergy Arkansas LLC. Louisiana is served by Entergy Louisiana, LLC and Entergy New Orleans, LLC. Texas is Served by Entergy, Texas Inc.

American Electric Power Co., Inc. (“AEP”) serves 5.5 million customers in eleven states—Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. https://www.aep.com/about/facts. AEP is a Climate Action 100+ target company, and in 2020 set an ambition to achieve Net zero GHG Emissions by 2050. https://www.climateaction100.org/company/american-electric-power-company-inc/. However, Climate Action 100+ has graded AEP in every category other than 2050 ambition as not meeting its criteria or only partially meeting its criteria. \textit{Id.} AEP now reports that its strategy is to achieve “net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2045, with an interim goal to cut emissions 80\% from 2005 levels by 2030.” https://www.aep.com/about/ourstory/cleanenergy. Moreover, AEP reports that, as of 2022, 41\% of its electricity generation came from coal, and 27\% came from natural gas. https://www.aep.com/about/businesses/generation. It reports that it intends to cut its percentage of electricity generation from coal from 41\% to 19\% by 2032 and increase its percentage of generation from hydro, wind, solar & pumped storage from 23\% to 53\% during the same time period. \textit{Id.} Consumers in the proposed intervenor States will be required to pay for this transition,

\textsuperscript{156} See Simply Wall St, \textit{Avista Corporation (NYSE:AVA) is a favorite amongst institutional investors who own 88\% (Apr. 13, 2023), available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/avista-corporation-nyse-ava-favorite-150847603.html#:--text=BlackRock%2C20Inc.%20is%20currently%20the,4.8%25%20of%20the%20company%20stock.}
pay any increased costs from these alternative sources of energy, and suffer the consequences of any loss of reliability in their power supply.


Mississippi is served by investor-owned utilities, whose ultimate parent companies are publicly traded. These include Mississippi Power Company, a subsidiary of Southern Company which conducts its business through electric operating companies in three states, natural gas distribution companies in four states, a competitive generation company serving wholesale customers across America, and a leading distributed energy infrastructure company, [https://www.southerncompany.com/sustainability/southern-company-overview.html](https://www.southerncompany.com/sustainability/southern-company-overview.html), and Entergy Mississippi, LLC, a subsidiary of Entergy Corporation which is an integrated energy company engaged in electric power production, transmission and retail distribution operations in four states, [https://www.entergy.com/about-us/](https://www.entergy.com/about-us/). These companies presently supply consumers in Mississippi and elsewhere in the Southeastern United States with energy generated from fossil fuel sources, including coal and natural gas. [https://www.southerncompany.com/about/our-business.html](https://www.southerncompany.com/about/our-business.html); [https://www.entergy.com/operations-information/](https://www.entergy.com/operations-information/). Consumers in Mississippi
would be harmed if their costs went up because of closure of these facilities or substitution to more expensive energy sources.

Missouri is served in part by Ameren Missouri, which is a subsidiary of Ameren Corporation. [https://www.ameren.com/company/about-ameren](https://www.ameren.com/company/about-ameren). Ameren Transmission Company designs and builds regional transmission projects. *Id.* As discussed more fully above, BlackRock owns over 5% of Ameren’s stock. *See supra* Section I.E. Moreover, Ameren has been a target of shareholder proposals by As You Sow, and therefore could affect its facilities, the cost to generate electricity, and Ameren’s competition with other electric utilities on the wholesale market. *Id.*

Montana is served by NorthWestern Energy, which is a publicly traded, investor-owned utility. [https://www.northwesternenergy.com/about-us](https://www.northwesternenergy.com/about-us). For example, NorthWestern Energy has a 30% ownership interest in Colstrip Unit 4 in Montana, which uses sub-bituminous coal. [https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/73088/000007308822000019/nwe-20211231.htm](https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/73088/000007308822000019/nwe-20211231.htm) at 13. NorthWestern states that stricter carbon limitations by governmental bodies “has the potential to limit or curtail our operations, including the burning of fossil fuels at our coal-fired power plants.” *Id.* at 21. Investors imposing this separate from government regulation would logically have the same effect.

South Carolina is served by several publicly traded utilities or subsidiaries of those utilities. Consumers in South Carolina would be harmed if their costs went up because of substitution to more expensive energy sources.

In addition, the States that the Attorneys General represent are themselves consumers of energy, and decisions by utility companies can affect the reliable and affordable supply of energy that the States themselves consume, which creates a pecuniary interest in this matter. These direct and substantial interests will not be adequately protected without the intervention of the States
through their Attorneys General. On top of this, participation by the States through their Attorneys General is in the public interest. Because the Attorneys General are elected officials who regularly take actions involving consumer protection and competition, they bring an important consumer-protection and pro-competitive perspective. For these reasons, intervention is in the public interest, and the Commission should grant the Attorneys General on behalf of the States leave to intervene in this proceeding with full rights as a party.

C. **The States’ Motion Is Timely Or, in the Alternative, There Is Good Cause to Intervene Out of Time**

1. **The States’ Motion Is Timely.**

Rule 214 allows intervention at any time when there has not been a period set for such motion under Rule 210, and it allows intervention out of time upon a showing of good cause.\(^{157}\) The intervention here is not to oppose the grant of blanket authorization to BlackRock in the first place. Rather, it is (1) to ask the Commission to determine if there are separate holding companies (CA100+ and NZAM, as well as their members) that have not been disclosed or received authorization from the Commission under FPA Section 203, and (2) to ask the Commission to audit and exercise its ongoing jurisdiction under that authorization.

First, as to the additional holding companies, the only relevant deadline set was the deadline of March 11, 2022, for the application by BlackRock for reauthorization itself. The Commission has never undertaken to grant blanket authorization to CA100+ or NZAM, so no notice or deadline was provided to intervene in such an authorization.

Second, the States’ request for audit and exercise of ongoing jurisdiction also does not challenge the blanket authorization itself, and thus the deadline to intervene for the reauthorization itself does not appear to apply on its face. Because there is no deadline for intervention other than

\(^{157}\) 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(3), (d)(1).
relating to reauthorization, and this motion is not disputing the reauthorization but rather asking the Commission to exercise ongoing jurisdiction that the Commission expressly reserved, this motion is timely. However, even if the Commission treats this as a motion for intervention out of time, it is supported by good cause as explained below.

2. **If the States’ Motion Is Out-of-Time, Then There Is Good Cause for Failure to File a Motion Within the Time Prescribed.**

The States submit that there is good cause for not having sought timely intervention. If the movant can “show good cause why the time limitation should be waived,” the Commission may act upon an out-of-time motion. Specifically, the Commission may consider whether: (1) the movant had good cause for failing to file the motion within the time prescribed; (2) any disruption to the proceeding or prejudice to existing parties might result from intervention; and (3) the movant’s interest is not adequately represented by other parties in the proceeding.

At bottom, the States have brought this motion now because it is clear (as of March 15, 2023) that BlackRock will not voluntarily withdraw from CA100+ and NZAM, but instead will stay the course of horizontal agreements to influence utility companies. Historically, BlackRock appeared to focus on its portfolio companies’ investment returns. In 2018 and 2019, for example, BlackRock supported around only 10% of climate-related shareholder resolutions. Just a year later, however, BlackRock decided that climate change had ushered in “a fundamental reshaping of finance.” In the second half of 2020, after joining CA100+, BlackRock supported 54% of all

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158 Id.
159 Id. § 385.214(d)(1). The Commission may also consider whether the motion states “the position taken by the movant and the basis in fact and law for that position,” as well as whether the movant “represents an interest which may be directly affected by the outcome of the proceeding” and whether the “movant’s participation is in the public interest.” Id. § 385.214(b)(1)-(3). The States believe they have adequately addressed these considerations in Section II.B–C of this motion and, therefore, will not devote more attention to them here.
160 Cruise et al., supra note 93.
161 Fink 2020 CEO Letter.
environmental and social proposals.\textsuperscript{162} BlackRock also “voted against the election of 255 directors as a result of climate-related concerns.”\textsuperscript{163}

Although BlackRock’s promises to shape American energy policy began in 2020, until more recently the States could not predict the lengths BlackRock would go in its quest to cure climate change. This includes BlackRock taking voting action against the boards of utility companies for failure to conform to BlackRock’s environmental ideology. Only recently has national attention on BlackRock’s commitment to the environmental, social, and governance movement resulted in the public exposure of relevant explanations and facts from BlackRock.\textsuperscript{164}

Indeed, a BlackRock representative’s testimony before a Texas committee in December was the first time BlackRock publicly explained its ESG practices under oath.\textsuperscript{165}

While this was ongoing, multiple Commissioners made statements regarding the Commission’s practice of granting blanket authorizations that have informed the States of the risks

\textsuperscript{162} Fink 2021 Client Letter at p. 10; see also Cruise et al., \textit{supra} note 93.


posed by BlackRock specifically relating to authorization under Section 203. Vanguard filed an application for reauthorization of its blanket authorizations.\textsuperscript{166} After the Commission staff granted a brief extension to Vanguard, Commissioners Danly and Christie issued a joint statement, demanding more scrutiny over asset managers that “could potentially exercise profound control over the Utilities [they] own.”\textsuperscript{167} The Commissioners ordered Vanguard to answer certain questions and produce various documents so that the Commission could ensure that the blanket authorizations were in the public interest.\textsuperscript{168} Vanguard filed a new request for an extension, apparently without producing the information or documents requested by Commissioners Danly and Christie.\textsuperscript{169} On November 28, 2022, the States moved to intervene in that matter, and Vanguard pulled out of its membership in NZAM. As discussed, Vanguard has since indicated that it will not continue to pledge fealty to the cause of ESG. \textit{See supra} pages 4–5.

Following the States’ intervention in Vanguard, and Vanguard’s withdrawal from NZAM, the States were then waiting to see what BlackRock would do. Normally BlackRock speaks through its CEO Larry Fink’s annual letters to CEOs and clients issued in January. However, this year, BlackRock delayed issuing the letters and then only issued a single letter on March 15, 2023.\textsuperscript{170} That letter makes it clear BlackRock would not follow Vanguard’s lead and withdraw from the horizontal organizations it joined—including NZAM and CA100+.

Given BlackRock’s continued membership, the Commission must examine, with a robust evidentiary record, the effect of this horizontal organization on competition, rates, and regulation.

\textsuperscript{166} Docket Nos. EC19-57-001 and EC19-57-002.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Id.} at Ordering Paragraph I.A–E.
\textsuperscript{170} Fink 2023 Letter.
As described above, the States have a clear interest in whether BlackRock may attempt to control public utilities operating in our markets. The States therefore respectfully request that the Commission find good cause for any untimeliness in the motion and allow the Attorneys General to fulfill their statutory duties to protect their States’ interests.

3. Disruption and Prejudice

The States’ intervention will not cause disruption to these proceedings nor prejudice to BlackRock. The States are cognizant that BlackRock received reauthorization, and this Motion specifically does not challenge that prior decision. But the Commission always has the authority to set an evidentiary hearing and/or issue a supplemental order.\(^{171}\) When the Commission extended BlackRock’s blanket authorizations in April 2022, it warned BlackRock that the agency “retain[ed] authority under sections 203(b) and 309 of the FPA to issue supplemental orders as appropriate” and that BlackRock was “subject to audit to determine whether [it is] in compliance with the representations, conditions, and requirements that the authorizations granted in this order are based on.”\(^{172}\) The Commission has therefore put BlackRock on notice that it might take further action under the 2022 BlackRock Order before the end of the three-year reauthorization period.

To the extent that BlackRock’s representations remain accurate—that it is a merely passive investor in utility companies—BlackRock would have ample opportunity in an evidentiary hearing to prove up those representations. To the extent that BlackRock’s representations were inaccurate or incomplete, BlackRock cannot be heard to claim prejudice against attempts to bring that

\(^{171}\) See 16 U.S.C. § 824b(b) (“The Commission may from time to time for good cause shown make such orders supplemental to any order made under this section as it may find necessary or appropriate.”); \(id.\) § 825h (“The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”).

\(^{172}\) 2022 BlackRock Order at Ordering Paragraph (E), (L).
discrepancy to light and ensure the legitimacy of the Commission’s processes and observance of the rule of law.

4. Adequate Representation

Finally, the interests of the States are not adequately represented by any other party. The States note that Public Citizen, Inc.—a non-profit advocacy organization—intervened in this proceeding in March 2022 as to the reauthorization itself. Public Citizen protested BlackRock’s request for reauthorization on the grounds that it is impossible for a fund manager of BlackRock’s size and influence to remain a passive investor and that allowing BlackRock to acquire up to 20% of a utility’s voting securities without any analysis on the effects on competition or rates violates the public interest.\textsuperscript{173} The Commission denied Public Citizen’s protest, finding that BlackRock had “provided assurances sufficient to demonstrate that [it] will not be able to influence control over U.S. Traded Utilities.”\textsuperscript{174}

The States do not believe that Public Citizen adequately represents the States’ interests, which include the interests of citizens, businesses, utilities, statutes, and regulatory regimes concerning utilities that are affected by the decisions of this Commission—interests distinct from that of Public Citizen. Second, Public Citizen did not argue that BlackRock had violated the Commission’s condition not to control the day-to-day operations or management of utilities. Nor did Public Citizen cite evidence regarding BlackRock’s flagrant motive to control utilities to promote the transition to net zero carbon emissions. These commitments raise additional issues relevant to the public interest and vital to determining whether BlackRock has complied with the Commission’s order. Finally, Public Citizen has taken the opposite position of the Attorneys

\textsuperscript{174} 2022 BlackRock Order at P 19.
General (and of the explicit conditions of the Commission’s authorizations) by arguing that asset managers should exercise more control over utilities. According to media reports, Public Citizen stated its position was “very different from what the AGs are saying” and expressed concern that asset managers did not “push companies harder on climate change.” 175 Absent the States’ intervention, no party will fully brief these issues for the Commission’s consideration.

III. The States’ Motion for the Commission to Exercise Its Ongoing Authority Under the Reauthorization Should Also Be Granted

A. The Commission Must Investigate Whether CA100+ and NZAM Constitute “Holding Companies,” and It Must Issue Appropriate Orders as to BlackRock, Which Is a Member of Both.

Both CA100+ and NZAM, including their members and signatories such as BlackRock, fall under the plain language of a “holding company” in Section 203 of the FPA. This is significant for two reasons: First, on information and belief, neither of these larger holding companies has received Commission approval to acquire shares (through its members) in utilities beyond the limits in FPA Section 203. But even if these holding companies were to seek authorization now, the Commission’s has established a limit of 20% ownership by any asset-manager holding company, 176 and each organization’s members collectively hold more than that limit for certain utilities. See supra pages 37-41. The Commission also has required holding companies to agree to conditions, which CA100+ and NZAM have never agreed to—the Commission does not simply rubber stamp whatever ownership a holding company seeks. 177 CA100+’s and NZAM’s actions


176 See, e.g., Franklin Res., Inc., 126 FERC ¶ 61,250 at P 39–40, order on reh’g, 127 FERC ¶ 61,224.

177 See, e.g., Franklin Res., Inc., 127 FERC ¶ 61,224 at P 8 (noting “Applicants’ commitment not to engage in certain specified activities that could lead to the exercise of control over the management or affairs of a U.S. Traded Utility”).

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are therefore fundamentally at odds with the Commission’s requirements for FPA Section 203. And BlackRock, as a member of these holding companies, would likewise be in violation of Section 203 for the collective actions of the larger holding companies that have not been authorized.

The definitions of “holding company” are broad and cover an “association” or unincorporated “organized group” consisting of CA100+ and its investor signatories acquiring shares in utilities. FPA Section 203(a)(2) prohibits a “holding company in a holding company system that includes a transmitting utility or an electric utility” from “purchas[ing], acquir[ing], or tak[ing] any security with a value in excess of $10,000,000 … without first having secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so.” 178

FPA Section 203(a)(6) provides that the term “‘holding company’ … [has] the meaning given [it] in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005” (“PUHCA”). 179 PUHCA provides that the definition of “holding company” can be met by either of the following:

(i) any company that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of a public-utility company or of a holding company of any public-utility company; and

(ii) any person, determined by the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, to exercise directly or indirectly (either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with one or more persons) such a controlling influence over the management or policies of any public-utility company or holding company as to make it necessary or appropriate for the rate protection of utility customers with respect to rates that such person be subject to the obligations, duties, and liabilities imposed by this part upon holding companies. 180

PUHCA further defines “company” as “a corporation, partnership, association, joint stock company, business trust, or any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not, or a

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179 Id. § 824b(a)(6).
receiver, trustee, or other liquidating agent of any of the foregoing.”\textsuperscript{181} And it defines a “person” as “an individual or company.”\textsuperscript{182}

CA100+ and its signatories fall within the plain language of the first definition of “holding company,” because they constitute an “association” or “any organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not.” Interpreting similar language in Section 3(3) of the FPA,\textsuperscript{183} the Commission described this choice of words by Congress as “very broad.”\textsuperscript{184} The Commission’s predecessor also held, “\textit{[certainly, Cotton Valley Operators Committee} comes within the definition of the term ‘person’, as it is used under the [Natural Gas] Act and the Commission’s Rules, since it \textit{is at the very least, an organized group of persons}; it was thus a “Natural-gas company” under that act.\textsuperscript{185}

CA100+ is an “association” or an “organized group of persons” because it has formal membership through “signatories to the initiative.”\textsuperscript{186} That membership status has consequences, including that members are “responsible for direct engagements with focus companies, individually and/or collaboratively.”\textsuperscript{187} CA100+ further spells out its “engagement process”:

Engagement with focus company executives and board members is spearheaded by a lead investor or investors, who work cooperatively with a number of collaborating investors. Investors can also engage with focus companies on an individual basis, but are required to: liaise with relevant network staff and/or lead investors to ensure engagement priorities and ambition are aligned with the goals of the initiative, as well as with the overall collaborative approach (as appropriate in each sector). Engagement is cent[e]red around the three asks of the initiative, and

\textsuperscript{181} 42 U.S.C. § 16451(4) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{182} Id. § 16451(12).
\textsuperscript{183} 16 U.S.C. § 796(3)
\textsuperscript{185} Midstates Oil Corp., 20 F.P.C. 70, 88 (1958) (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{186} CA100+, Investor Signatories, \url{https://www.climateaction100.org/whos-involved/investors/}.
\textsuperscript{187} Id.
a central message of each engagement is that inaction by companies following engagement may result in investors taking further action.

...Lead investors, and those engaging companies individually, must disclose through a biannual survey their engagement plans and priorities over the coming 12 months to ensure strong and concerted action.\footnote{CA100+, Engagement Process (emphasis added), https://www.climateaction100.org/approach/engagement-process/} The reference to “further action” and “strong and concerted action” appears to encompass voting. Moreover, CA100+ states that investors handling an engagement are “not preclude[d from] referring to the total number of signatories and/or represented assets of the full initiative.”\footnote{Id.} CA100+ also has a formal leadership structure and steering committee.\footnote{See, e.g., CA100+ 2022 Benchmark Increase Statement (providing quotes from chair, vice-chair, and members of the “global Steering Committee”).}

While CA100+ claims that its signatories retain ultimate decision-making on how to vote their shares, this is not something that exempts CA100+ and its members from FPA Section 203(a)(2) and (6). The members of CA100+ (and therefore CA100+ as a “company”) “own[, control[, or hold[, with power to vote, 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of a public Utility company.” See 42 U.S.C. § 16451(8)(A). Because CA100+ works to achieve a common goal among their members related to influencing utilities they own shares in to adopt net zero in their operations, it follows that the acquisition of stock by any one of their members (such as BlackRock) is attributable to each of the other members for purposes of the definition of a “holding company.”\footnote{See Brady v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 682, 689 (1955) (holding that, in a joint venture, “the acts of each are attributable to all”); BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Cashman Equip. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 3d 876, 894 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“By the general law of partnership, the act of each partner, during the continuance of the partnership and within the scope of its objects, binds all the others.” (quoting Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 351, 370 (1828))); Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc., 38 B.R. 123}
NZAM is also an organized group of persons that meets the first definition of a “holding company.” It explains that “301 asset managers, with USD 59 trillion in assets*, have committed to achieve net zero alignment by 2050 or sooner, drawing on the Net Zero Investment Framework to deliver these commitments.”\(^{192}\) NZAM further explains what the “commit[ment]” by signatories requires.\(^{193}\) This includes, “[a]cross all assets under management … [i]mplement a stewardship and engagement strategy, with a clear escalation and voting policy, that is consistent with our ambition for all assets under management to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or sooner.”\(^{194}\) The commitment at issue thus not only references engagement but also voting.

CA100+ and NZAM also meet the second definition of “holding company.” 42 U.S.C. § 16451(8)(A)(ii). The Commission has explained that the second definition “pertains to situations where the entity does not fall within the formal definition of a holding company set forth in [42 U.S.C. § 16451(8)(A)(i)], but there is nevertheless a reason to treat that entity as a holding company.”\(^{195}\) For all of the reasons discussed above, CA100+ and NZAM, including their members, have “such a controlling influence over the management or policies of any public-utility company or holding company as to make it necessary or appropriate for the rate protection of utility customers with respect to rates that such person be subject to the obligations, duties, and liabilities imposed by this part upon holding companies.”\(^{196}\) The Commission should thus decide that these organized groups are “holding companies.”

\(^{127}\) (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (noting that a “partner’s action binds the partnership whether the . . . partner acts in his own name or in the partnership name”).
\(^{192}\) NZAM, Signatories, https://www.netzeroassetmanagers.org/signatories/.
\(^{193}\) NZAM, Commitment, https://www.netzeroassetmanagers.org/commitment/.
\(^{194}\) Id.
\(^{195}\) Horizon Asset Mgmt., Inc., 125 FERC ¶ 61,209, 62,087 (2008).
Moreover, CA100+ and its investor signatories would not meet the exception the Commission has previously set forth for not aggregating shares owned by different entities within a larger holding company. For example in *Capital Research & Management Co.*, the Commission ruled that the holdings of the different subsidiaries would not be aggregated, but that was in part because they were “conduct[ing] their . . . proxy voting activities independently.”\(^{197}\) Here, as discussed above, many of the “proxy voting activities” related to net zero—including but not limited to engagement of focus companies and the threat of “further action”—is coordinated by CA100+. CA100+ even has a formal list of 166 “focus companies” for coordinated action,\(^{198}\) and requires that signatories coordinate with “lead investors” engaging with each of the “focus companies” in order “to ensure engagement priorities and ambition are aligned with the goals of the initiative.”\(^{199}\) Aggregating the holdings of the investor signatories across the “holding company” of CA100+ and its members is therefore proper and cannot be exempted.

NZAM similarly would not meet the exception the Commission’s prior decisions have set forth for not aggregating shares owned by different entities within a larger holding company. As discussed above, NZAM members are required to commit to “[i]mplement a stewardship and engagement strategy, with a clear escalation and voting policy, that is consistent with our ambition for all assets under management to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or sooner.”\(^{200}\) Thus, as to net zero, the proxy voting activities of the members are not sufficiently independent that the Commission would not aggregate their holdings across the “holding company.”

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\(^{197}\) See, e.g., *Cap. Rsch. & Mgmt. Co.*, 116 FERC ¶ 61,267, 62,068 P 22-23 (2006); see also *Franklin Res., Inc. & Its Inv. Mgmt. Subsidiaries & Applicant Funds*, 126 FERC ¶ 61,250 at P 39–40, order on reh’g, 127 FERC ¶ 61,224 (rejecting request for “unlimited blanket authorization”).

\(^{198}\) CA100+, *Companies*, https://www.climateaction100.org/whos-involved/companies/.


B. The Commission Must Also Investigate and Issue Appropriate Orders Regarding BlackRock’s Actions to Influence Control of Utilities

There is a second, independent reason why the Commission must exercise its ongoing authority under the reauthorization: BlackRock has not acted as a “passive, non-controlling investor[]” as to its own shares, as it represented to the Commission it would throughout its reauthorization and authorization applications over the past 13 years.201

The Commission’s orders have never authorized BlackRock to engage in “any activity designed to … influence the day-to-day commercial conduct of [an FPA-covered utility’s] business,”202 or to “[s]eek to determine or influence whether generation, transmission, distribution or other physical assets of the Utility are made available or withheld from the marketplace; … or [s]eek to participate in or influence any other operational decision of the Utility.”203 Those representations continue to bind BlackRock through its subsequent requests for reauthorization. In fact, in 2022, the Commission specifically relied on the fact that BlackRock “provided assurances sufficient to demonstrate that they will not be able to influence control over U.S. Traded Utilities.”204 The Commission cannot simply ignore the representations that BlackRock made and actions BlackRock disclaimed when it sought authorization and reauthorization from the Commission to file Schedule 13G or 13D forms. The facts raised in the States’ motion show that BlackRock has acted contrary to those representations.

201 See 2022 BlackRock Application at 10; see also id. at 11 (stating that “the interests acquired by the Applicants would be passive”).
203 2016 BlackRock Order at *2 (discussing BlackRock’s representations of its actions when filing S.E.C. Schedule 13D forms with the Commission).
204 2022 BlackRock Order at P 19.
As discussed throughout, BlackRock has used its enormous financial clout to influence and control the day-to-day conduct and operational decisions of FPA-covered utilities. See, e.g., supra pages 26-30. Some of the publicly available evidence indicating BlackRock’s activist intentions include:

- BlackRock CEO Larry Fink stated in his 2020 Letter to CEOs—including CEOs of publicly traded utility companies—that he “believe[s] we are on the edge of a fundamental reshaping of finance.”

- Mr. Fink said BlackRock will be “increasingly disposed to vote against management and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans underlying them.”

- Mr. Fink’s 2021 Letter to Clients stated that “BlackRock [is] making sustainability our new standard for investing.” He also stated that BlackRock is “explicitly asking that all companies disclose a business plan aligned with the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C, consistent with achieving net zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.”

- BlackRock—consistent with joining CA100+ and NZAM—adopted a policy seeking disclosure and targets aligned with less than 2°C of global warming. And BlackRock specifically urges portfolio companies to disclose targets that are “[c]onsistent with the TCFD, … including a scenario in which global warming is limited to well below 2°C, and considering global ambitions to achieve a limit of 1.5°C.”

- In the second half of 2020, after joining CA100+, BlackRock supported 54% of all environmental and social proposals, up from about 10% of such proposals prior to the 2020 proxy season. This represents a five-fold increase in support of activist proposals by BlackRock since joining CA100+. BlackRock touted that it not only took voting action against 69 companies but also put 191 companies “on watch,” meaning such “on watch” companies face risk of ongoing voting action unless they make progress on their “transition plans to a net zero economy.”

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205 Fink 2020 CEO Letter.
206 Id. (emphasis added).
207 Fink 2020 Client Letter.
208 Id.
209 Climate-Related Risk and the Energy Transition at 2.
210 Fink 2021 Client Letter; see also Cruise et al., supra note 93.
211 Fink 2021 Client Letter.
2020–2021 proxy season, BlackRock held over 2,300 company “engagements” on environmental issues with its portfolio companies.\textsuperscript{212}

- In 2021, BlackRock voted against the Chairman of the Board for FirstEnergy, an Ohio-based electric utility that is a CA100+ focus company because the company “does not have a rigorous net zero strategy.”\textsuperscript{213}

- BlackRock voted in 2021 against a director for Dominion Energy—a another CA100+ focus company—because the company did not meet BlackRock’s “expectations of having adequate climate risk disclosures against all 4 pillars of TCFD at this time, including Scope 3 disclosures.”\textsuperscript{214}

The Commission must ensure that BlackRock is adhering to the limitations on “influence,” regardless of whether BlackRock is filing a Schedule 13G or 13D disclosure for a particular U.S. Traded Utility. The Commission should do so as a proper exercise of its audit and supplemental order powers under the 2022 BlackRock Order. If BlackRock returns to functioning as a passive owner and withdraws from CA100+, NZAM, and other associations seeking to influence control of FPA-covered utilities, it may properly continue acquiring shares to the limits established by the Commission. Absent those corrective actions, it must not be permitted to acquire more shares in violation of § 824b(a)(2).

C. The Commission Should Set an Evidentiary Hearing on the States’ Motion

The States also request that the Commission set an evidentiary hearing on their Motion, with sufficient opportunity for fact-gathering. The issues raised are of major public importance. To be able to decide the issues, the Commission will need the benefit of facts. BlackRock’s application did not provide facts on the issues raised herein. This hearing and evidence-gathering will in turn assist the Commission in determining whether it should further exercise its

\textsuperscript{212} Pursuing Long-Term Value for Our Clients at 8.
supplemental order authority under Sections 203(b) and 309 regarding BlackRock’s 2022 reauthorization.

**D. In the Alternative, the Commission Should Treat the States’ Motion as a Complaint.**

If the Commission denies intervention or concludes the relief requested is not properly sought under Rules 212 and 214, then the States request in the alternative that the Commission issue an order treating this filing as a complaint under Rule 206 for violations of 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2) and proceed accordingly. The requirements of Rule 206(b) and portions of the motion above that satisfy those requirements are set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Clearly identify the action or inaction which is alleged to violate applicable statutory standards or regulatory requirements;</td>
<td>See pages 11-41 (Background Facts).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Explain how the action or inaction violates applicable statutory standards or regulatory requirements;</td>
<td>See pages 54-62.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Set forth the business, commercial, economic or other issues presented by the action or inaction as such relate to or affect the complainant;</td>
<td>See pages 41-48 (discussing impact to the States and their citizens from BlackRock’s actions and its admission that the net zero agenda will cause inflation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Make a good faith effort to quantify the financial impact or burden (if any) created for the complainant as a result of the action or inaction;</td>
<td>As one data point, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provides that energy inflation for electricity has been 10.2% for the twelve months ending in March 2023. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) provides that the average electricity consumption by a residential utility consumer was 10,632 kWh in 2021. It also reports, as an example, that the average cost per kWh in the East South Central region</td>
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increased from 11.68 cents in January 2022 to 13.40 cents in January 2023.\textsuperscript{218} This represents an annual increase of approximately $182.87 per household (this works out to increasing from $1,241.82 to $1,424.69/year). Alabama’s population is 5.07 million. Assuming the above number is on a household basis, and there are 2.57 persons per household,\textsuperscript{219} Alabamians are paying $360.8 million more for residential electricity. Similar calculations could be performed for the other States joining in this filing.

The States are not able to apportion the financial impact beyond these estimates at this time.

(5) Indicate the practical, operational, or other nonfinancial impacts imposed as a result of the action or inaction, including, where applicable, the environmental, safety or reliability impacts of the action or inaction;

On information and belief, the transition away from fossil fuels in electricity generation to non-fossil fuel technologies will reduce the reliability of electricity generation because generation sources like solar are inherently less reliable and are heavily reliant on foreign sources. To compensate for this, utilities will have to install battery storage. It unclear that this is technologically feasible at the scale that CA100+, NZAM, and their members demand to reduce fossil fuel usage to 25% by 2030 or net zero by 2035. It is also unclear how those additional requirements will affect costs to consumers.

(6) State whether the issues presented are pending in an existing Commission proceeding or a proceeding in any other forum in which the complainant is a party, and if so, provide an explanation why timely resolution cannot be achieved in that forum;

The States believe that timely resolution can be achieved in the forum of the Commission’s ongoing authority under BlackRock’s blanket authorization. They have brought this complaint only as an alternative.

\textsuperscript{218} EIA, \textit{Electric Power Monthly: Table 5.6.A. Average Price of Electricity to Ultimate Consumers by End-Use Sector}, \url{https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_6_a}.

\textsuperscript{219} U.S. Census Bureau, \textit{Quick Facts: Alabama}, \url{https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/AL}.  

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| (7) State the specific relief or remedy requested, including any request for stay or extension of time, and the basis for that relief; | The States respectfully ask the Commission: 1) to audit whether Applicants\(^{220}\) are in compliance with their representations and commitments in their application for reauthorization and the terms of the 2022 BlackRock Order, and 2) to issue supplemental orders and other appropriate relief, including ordering Applicants to function as passive, non-controlling investors and to cease all coordination with other asset managers and asset owners to influence control of utility operations before “purchas[ing], acquir[ing], or tak[ing] any” further securities in any FPA-covered utility. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824b(a)(2), (b), 825h. |
| (8) Include all documents that support the facts in the complaint in possession of, or otherwise attainable by, the complainant, including, but not limited to, contracts and affidavits; | This brief cites documents in footnotes as applicable. The States do not presently have any contracts other than those explained in the CA100+ and NZAM websites, which are cited herein. The States do not presently have any affidavits. |
| (9) State (i) Whether the Enforcement Hotline, Dispute Resolution Service, tariff-based dispute resolution mechanisms, or other informal dispute resolution procedures were used, or why these procedures were not used; (ii) Whether the complainant believes that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) under the Commission’s supervision could successfully resolve the complaint; (iii) What types of ADR procedures could be used; and (iv) Any process that has been agreed on for resolving the complaint. | The States do not believe that any of the resolutions described in paragraph (9) are applicable to the nature of issues raised in this Motion. |

\(^{220}\) “Applicants” refers to BlackRock, Inc., the Investment Management Subsidiaries, and the Applicant Funds, collectively. See supra note 2.
Finally, if the Commission decides to proceed with this filing as a complaint rather than a Motion, the States will prepare a form of notice of the complaint suitable for publication in the Federal Register in accordance with the specifications in 18 C.F.R. § 385.203(d).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the States of Utah, Indiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia respectfully request that the Commission grant the motion to intervene to participate in this proceeding with full rights as parties thereto. The States also respectfully request that the Commission exercise its ongoing authority under the 2022 BlackRock Order 1) to audit whether Applicants are in compliance with their representations and commitments in their application for reauthorization and the terms of the 2022 BlackRock Order, and 2) to issue supplemental orders and other appropriate relief, including ordering Applicants to function as passive, non-controlling investors and to cease all coordination with other asset managers and asset owners to influence control of utility operations before “purchas[ing], acquir[ing], or tak[ing] any” further securities in any FPA-covered utility. The States further request that the Commission order an evidentiary hearing on this motion. If the Commission denies intervention or concludes that the relief requested is not properly sought under Rules 212 and 214, then the States request in the alternative that the Commission issue an order treating this filing as a complaint under Rule 206 for violation of 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(2) and proceed accordingly.

221 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824b(a)(2), (b), 825h.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document on each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in this proceeding.


/s/ Melissa A. Holyoak