Treasury Targets Syrian Conglomerate Funding Qods Force and Houthis

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the Al-Qatirji Company, a Syrian conglomerate responsible for generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis through the sale of Iranian oil to Syria and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Previously designated for its role in facilitating the sale of fuel between the Syrian regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qatirji Company has morphed into one of the main channels through which the IRGC-QF generates revenue and funds its regional proxy groups. OFAC is expanding its targeting of Al-Qatirji’s network and its fleet of vessels to inhibit the IRGC-QF from benefiting from this relationship. 

“Iran is increasingly relying on key business partners like the Al-Qatirji Company to fund its destabilizing activities and web of terrorist proxies across the region,” said Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Bradley T. Smith. “Treasury will continue to take all available measures to restrict the Iranian regime’s ability to profit from the illicit schemes that enable its dangerous regional agenda.”

Today’s action is being taken pursuant to counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. OFAC designated the IRGC-QF pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing material support to multiple terrorist groups. The Al-Qatirji Company was designated pursuant to E.O. 13582 on September 6, 2018 for its ties to the Government of Syria. The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah, also known as the Houthis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, effective February 16, 2024, for having committed or attempted to commit, posing a significant risk of committing, or having participated in training to commit acts of terrorism. 

THE AL-QATIRJI COMPANY, THE IRGC-QF, AND IRANIAN PROXIES

The Al-Qatirji Company exports millions of barrels of Iranian oil, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, to Syria and East Asia, including the PRC, to finance the IRGC-QF and Houthis. As of 2024, the Al-Qatirji Company has become one of the IRGC-QF’s main financial channels, enabling the IRGC-QF to generate and access hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue this year alone, much of which is laundered through major cities such as Istanbul and Beirut. Some of the oil proceeds are ultimately sent to the Houthis, who receive millions of dollars per month from the Al-Qatirji Company.

The Al-Qatirji Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.

The Al-Qatirji Company controls the following vessels, which it uses to transport Iranian petroleum: Guyana-flagged BARON (IMO: 9080493), Iran-flagged ROMINA (IMO: 9114608), Guyana-flagged CHLOE (IMO: 9173745), Palau-flagged JOEL (IMO: 9198094), Iran-flagged LOTUS (IMO: 9203784), Panama-flagged REX 1 (IMO: 9219056), Guyana-flagged RAMONA I (IMO: 9233222), Barbados-flagged LELIA (IMO: 9258870), Barbados-flagged ELINE (IMO: 9292486), Panama-flagged CELINE (IMO: 9305609), Guyana-flagged MIA (IMO: 9018464), and Guyana-flagged LIA (IMO: 9041057). The Al-Qatirji Company has coordinated oil shipments worth tens of millions of dollars with the IRGC-QF using the BARON and Iran-flagged STAR 5 (IMO: 9150377).

The Al-Qatirji Company is the ultimate beneficial owner of the LELIA, JOEL, ELINE, and CELINE. The Al-Qatirji Company proposed to return these vessels to the IRGC-QF to settle tens of millions of dollars’ worth of debts.

The LELIA, ELINE, and CELINE are managed and operated by India-based Salina Ship Management Pvt Ltd. Panama-based Bluespectrum Shipping S.A. serves as the registered owner, ship manager, and operator of the JOEL.

Salina Ship Management Pvt Ltd and Bluespectrum Shipping S.A. are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Al-Qatirji Company. The LELIA, ELINE, and CELINE are being identified as blocked property in which Salina Ship Management Pvt Ltd has an interest. The JOEL is being identified as blocked property in which Bluespectrum Shipping S.A. has an interest.

The REX 1 is managed, owned, and operated by Lebanon-based Softwater Navigation Holding Ltd.. The BARON is managed and owned by Lebanon-based Pearl Shipping & Trading Ltd. The RAMONA I is owned by Panama-based Elias Shipping & Trading Group SA. Iran-based Moshtaq Tejarat Sanat Co JSC is the registered owner of the STAR 5. Marshall Islands-based Nativa Management Ltd is the owner and manager of the LIA. Iran-based Amitis Jazireh Kish Ship Management Co LLC is the ship manager of the ROMINA. Seychelles-based Veline Shiptrade Incorporated is the owner and operator of the MIA.

Softwater Navigation Holding Ltd., Pearl Shipping & Trading Ltd, Elias Shipping & Trading Group SA, Moshtaq Tejarat Sanat Co JSC, Nativa Management Ltd, Amitis Jazireh Kish Ship Management Co LLC, and Veline Shiptrade Incorporated are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Al-Qatirji Company.

The REX 1 is being identified as blocked property in which Softwater Navigation Holding Ltd. has an interest. The BARON is being identified as blocked property in which Pearl Shipping & Trading Ltd has an interest. The RAMONA I is being identified as blocked property in which Elias Shipping & Trading Group SA has an interest. The STAR 5 is being identified as blocked property in which Moshtaq Tejarat Sanat Co JSC has an interest. The LIA is being identified as blocked property in which Nativa Management Ltd has an interest. The ROMINA is being identified as blocked property in which Amitis Jazireh Kish Ship Management Co LLC has an interest. The MIA is being identified as blocked property in which Veline Shiptrade Incorporated has an interest. The LOTUS and the CHLOE are being identified as blocked property in which the Al-Qatirji Company has an interest.

AL-QATIRJI COMPANY LEADERSHIP

Hussam Bin Ahmed Rushdi Al-Qatirji (Hussam Al-Qatirji) has become a leader of the Al-Qatirji Company since the death of Muhammad Al-Qatirji in mid-2024. Executives of the Al-Qatirji Company have met directly with senior officials of the IRGC-QF, as well as with their other financial supporters, including sanctioned IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal. Hussam Al-Qatirji, together with Muhammad Agha Ahmed Rashdi Qatirji, works on the Al-Qatirji Company’s oil portfolio. ‘Abbas Katerji, Muhammad Al-Qatirji’s son, also works for the Al-Qatirji Company.

Hussam Al-Qatirji is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Al-Qatirji Company. Hussam Al-Qatirji was previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13573 on November 9, 2020 for his role in brokering the Syrian regime’s oil trade with ISIS.

Muhammad Agha Ahmed Rashdi Qatirji and ‘Abbas Katerji are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Al-Qatirji Company.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals and entities named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other blocked persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons. U.S. persons must comply with OFAC regulations, including all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all persons within the United States, and all U.S.-incorporated entities and their foreign branches. Non-U.S. persons are also subject to certain OFAC prohibitions. For example, non-U.S. persons are prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Violations of OFAC regulations may result in civil or criminal penalties. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations based on strict liability, meaning that a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be held civilly liable even if such person did not know or have reason to know that it was engaging in a transaction that was prohibited under sanctions laws and regulations administered by OFAC. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions, including the factors that OFAC generally considers when determining an appropriate response to an apparent violation. For additional information on complying with U.S. sanctions and export control laws, please see Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Justice Tri-Seal Compliance Note.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated today entails risk of secondary sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Pursuant to this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account of any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

Click here for more information on the individual and entities identified today.

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