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Argued December 5, 2024 — Decided July 7, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division. No. 20-cv-144 — Richard L. Young, Judge.
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Michael Lairy petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming in part that he did not qualify for the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) mandatory 15-year sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue. The government did not address the underlying merits of Lairy’s claims but asserted that he raised them after the statute of limitations had expired. The district court held Lairy to his untimeliness and denied his petition. In so doing, the court rejected Lairy’s arguments that the government forfeited the statute of limitations defense, he was actually innocent of ACCA, and he was entitled to equitable tolling. For the reasons below, we agree with the district court’s evaluation of forfeiture and disposition on actual innocence. But the district court abused its discretion by rejecting equitable tolling without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. We therefore vacate the denial of the petition and remand to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling.
Argued May 13, 2025 — Decided July 7, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:22-cv-03164 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. David Bourke was a disabled employee of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA granted Bourke’s request for a reserved parking space outside the building where he worked to reasonably accommodate his disability. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, that accommodation no longer comported with the VA’s prevention measures. So, the VA offered Bourke an alternate accommodation that also complied with its efforts to hinder the disease’s spread. Bourke declined the alternate accommodation and sued, alleging a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He believed it put his mobility scooter at risk of being stolen. The district court disagreed and entered summary judgment for the VA. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the VA failed to offer Bourke a reasonable accommodation, we affirm.
Submitted May 9, 2025 — Decided July 7, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22-cv-3559 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge. Before MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge; AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Ruben Santoyo appeals the denial of two post-judgment motions to reinstate his lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the two Chicago police officers who arrested him. Because Santoyo’s motions were frivolous, as is this appeal, we affirm.
Submitted May 9, 2025 — Decided July 7, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:22-cv-03559 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In the course of litigation against the City of Chicago and two of its police officers, Ruben Santoyo filed many frivolous motions. The district judge warned him that another would bring sanctions. When Santoyo disregarded the admonition and filed yet another baseless and inflammatory motion, the district judge sanctioned him. On appeal Santoyo complains that the judge violated his right to due process by neither notifying him of the forthcoming sanction nor giving him an opportunity to respond. We disagree and affirm.
Argued November 6, 2024 — Decided July 8, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:23-cv-02411 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
Before BRENNAN, KOLAR, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Deputy James Reilly alleges that his employer, the Will County Sheriff’s Office, and his boss, Sheriff Michael Kelley, retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. Reilly contends that Sheriff Kelley passed him over for promotion to sergeant because he criticized the sheriff while running against him in the county sheriff election. The defendants moved to dismiss Reilly’s complaint, arguing that it was untimely because Reilly filed the complaint over two years after his eligibility for a promotion expired. The district court agreed that Reilly was out of time, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and entered judgment in their favor. Reilly requested that the district court set aside its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and allow him to amend his complaint. The district court denied leave to amend, believing that Reilly needed to present extraordinary circumstances to justify relief and failed to do so. In reaching its conclusion, the district court mistakenly applied a heightened standard to Reilly’s Rule 59(e) motion, requiring Reilly to present extraordinary circumstances instead of applying the liberal standard for amending pleadings. The court further erred in denying Reilly’s request for leave to amend his complaint. We conclude that Reilly’s proposed amended complaint states a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he has not pled himself out of court based on the statute of limitations. In doing so, we do not preclude the defendants from raising the statute of limitations defense later in the case on a more complete factual record. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Argued September 25, 2024 — Decided July 8, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:23-CV-00685 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller Anderson allege that Amazon violated federal and Illinois wage laws by failing to pay them and other warehouse employees for time spent in mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 screenings. The district court dismissed their Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL) claims, finding that both claims were foreclosed by the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), which amended the FLSA to exclude certain pre-shift activities from compensable time. On appeal, the employees challenge only the district court’s holding that the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclusions for compensable time. The employees contend that Illinois law affords them broader protections than federal law, and that their IMWL claims therefore should have survived dismissal. No Illinois decision squarely addresses whether the IMWL integrates the PPA’s limitations on pre-shift compensation. Rather than decide this important and unsettled question of state law in the first instance, we certify it to the Illinois Supreme Court. Certification respects federalism and ensures a definitive answer to this dispositive issue.
Argued January 16, 2025 — Decided July 8, 2025
Case Type: Agency
Surface Transportation Board. No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 2)
Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Before us is a petition challenging a Final Rule promulgated by the Surface Transportation Board following a notice-and-comment period. At its most basic level, the Final Rule allows a railway shipper or receiver to request what the Rule calls a “reciprocal switching agreement”—a regulatory tool the Board can use to require a rail carrier that has a monopoly over a certain rail line to compete with another carrier for particular rail traffic. Several rail carriers contend that the Final Rule exceeds the Board’s statutory authority under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, the statute in which Congress granted the agency authority to prescribe reciprocal switching. The carriers also argue that specific aspects of the Final Rule exceed the Board’s ancillary powers conferred by its enabling statute and, separately, are arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record. By its terms, the process the Final Rule prescribes to obtain a reciprocal switching agreement does not require a determination by the Board that an existing carrier’s rail service is inadequate. Because we interpret the Staggers Rail Act to require such a finding, this shortcoming compels us to conclude that the Rule exceeds the Board’s statutory authority. So we grant the petition and vacate the Final Rule.
Argued February 27, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18-cr-00758 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.
Before ST. EVE, LEE, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Pierre Robinson and Derrick Swanson were each charged with murdering an opposing gang member to advance their standing in Evans Mob, a street gang in Chicago’s Chatham neighborhood. While Swanson entered a cooperation agreement with the government and pleaded guilty, Robinson chose to proceed to trial. At Robinson’s trial, the government called Robinson’s cousin Anise to identify him as the man who shot and killed the victim, Glenn Houston, Jr. Anise had previously identified Robinson as the shooter in a recorded statement to Chicago police and before a grand jury. But she was unable to do so at trial, professing that a recent medical issue rendered her unable to recognize Robinson or remember her past identifications of him. In response, the government moved to admit both Anise’s statement to police and her grand jury testimony as a declarant witness’s prior inconsistent statements. The district court granted its motion. After a four-day trial, the jury convicted Robinson. Robinson and Swanson both appeal. Robinson contends that the admission of Anise’s testimonial hearsay statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. He also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Swanson challenges only his sentence, asserting that a condition of his supervised release conflicts with his sentence as orally pronounced. Finding no merit in Robinson or Swanson’s challenges, we affirm.
Argued September 11, 2024 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 17-cv-08120 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
Before DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge; MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Ted Velleff, on behalf of himself and a putative class, challenged as unconstitutional, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a policy at the Cook County Jail, Illinois, run by the Cook County Sheriff, pursuant to which an inmate’s government issued identification card may be destroyed if left unclaimed in jail storage for 45 days after the inmate is transferred from the Cook County Jail to state prison. The district court denied class certification and granted the Sheriff summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:21-CR-00277(8) — John F. Kness, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
DaJuan Gee pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court sentenced him to 54 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. Gee appeals, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that a case of this kind might be expected to involve. We notified Gee of counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)… We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
Argued April 10, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:22-cv-00965-BHL — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge.
Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Hammond Power Solutions manufactures and distributes electric transformers. From 2017 to 2022, Hammond Power purchased materially identical commercial liability insurance policies from the defendants, National Union Fire Insurance Company and Illinois National Insurance Company (together, AIG). The policies contained a coverage exclusion for claims for bodily injuries arising from “radioactive matter or any form of radiation.” In 2022, two people sued Hammond Power alleging harm from electromagnetic field (EMF) radiation coming from transformers near their apartment. The issue here is whether AIG was obliged to defend and indemnify Hammond Power in that lawsuit—which the parties agree involved “radiation” in the form of EMF radiation. Applying Wisconsin law, we agree with the district court that the coverage exclusion of “any form of radiation” means “any form of radiation,” including the EMF radiation alleged in the underlying lawsuit. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AIG.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:23-CR-00478(1) — Nancy L. Maldonado, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Matthew Burton appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). A defendant who appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788–90 (1973), so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Even so, our practice is to apply them. See United States v. Durham, 922 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2019). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Burton did not respond to the motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)… We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
Argued April 16, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. No. 2:22-cv-00107-MPB-MKK — Matthew P. Brookman, Judge.
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and LEE, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. B.D. sued Samsung SDI, a South Korean manufacturer, in Indiana after one of its batteries exploded in his pocket there. The company moved to dismiss B.D.’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), which the district court granted. Relevant here, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant only when that party has purposefully availed itself of the forum through its in-state contacts, the plaintiff’s lawsuit relates to those contacts, and it would otherwise be fair for the court to subject the defendant to its coercive power. Samsung SDI sells batteries to sophisticated customers for use as components in consumer products, including products widely available across the Hoosier State. The company has thus purposefully availed itself of the Indiana forum by exploiting an end-product stream of commerce. Samsung SDI has not, however, availed itself of the forum through sales of individual batteries—that is, the derivative product. It instead conducts its business to prevent ordinary consumers from purchasing those individual batteries in Indiana. Still, B.D. received the individual battery that exploded in his pocket after his stepfather purchased it from an e-cigarette retailer through an unauthorized transaction. There is a disconnect, then, between Samsung SDI’s purposeful contacts with the Indiana forum, through an end-product stream of commerce, and B.D.’s lawsuit, which stems from a consumer purchase of the derivative product. That disconnect forecloses an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision granting Samsung SDI’s motion to dismiss.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18 C 4058 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Ioan Lela, a pretrial detainee, appeals the district court’s summary judgment rejecting his claims that jail officials subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement by maintaining an inadequate air-ventilation system in his housing unit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Lela has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the jail officials acted unreasonably, we affirm.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 18-cv-1335-pp — Pamela Pepper, Chief Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Timothy Gove’s suit alleging employment discrimination and retaliation was dismissed at summary judgment because he failed to respond to Sargento Foods Inc.’s statement of material facts and did not support his own factual assertions with citations to admissible evidence in the record. As such, applying the local rules, the district court deemed Sargento’s facts admitted and, based on those admissions, entered summary judgment in its favor. Because district courts may reasonably require that even pro se litigants strictly comply with local rules, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore we affirm.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:22-cv-01993-TWP-MJD — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Joey Kimbrough appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failure to prosecute. The district court dismissed his suit after he failed to comply with the court’s directive to proceed with arbitration. Because the court appropriately exercised its discretion to dismiss the case, we affirm.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 23-C-1426 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
David Pearson, a prisoner at Green Bay Correctional Institution, sued the warden, deputy warden, and administrative captain for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that prison staff subjected him to unsanitary conditions—including an infestation of mice and fruit flies, a toilet with restricted flushing, a lack of cleaning supplies, and limited access to showers—and prohibited him from exercising for weeks at a time. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants because the conditions of which Pearson complained were not objectively serious enough to amount to a constitutional deprivation, and the defendants—who were operating with extreme staffing shortages—did not act with deliberate indifference. We affirm.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 9, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22-cv-6008 — Jeffrey I. Cummings, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Foster Chambers, a home-renovation contractor in the Village of Oak Park, Illinois, appeals the dismissal of his civil-rights lawsuit alleging that Village employees singled him out for disparate enforcement of building codes. Because Chambers admits violating the ordinances and because his theory of selective enforcement does not state a class-of-one claim under the Equal Protection Clause, we affirm.
Argued April 1, 2025 — Decided July 10, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:21-cv-05283 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In September 2021 Dr. Alan Braid, a Texas OB/GYN, wrote an editorial in the Washington Post admitting he performed an abortion in violation of the Texas Heartbeat Act. Three individuals from three different states reacted by each invoking the citizen-suit enforcement provision of the Texas Heartbeat Act and seeking to recover at least $10,000 in statutory damages. Now facing the prospect of duplicative liability, Dr. Braid made use of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, to join the claimants in a single suit. But, in an odd twist, he did not do so by going to any Texas federal court but instead by filing suit in federal court in Chicago. In addition to his interpleader claim, Dr. Braid sought declaratory relief, urging the district court to declare the Texas Heartbeat Act unconstitutional. The district court dismissed Dr. Braid’s entire suit, concluding that the existence of parallel state-court proceedings justified abstention under the Supreme Court’s Wilton-Brillhart doctrine. Though we chart a different course of reasoning, we ultimately reach the same end point and therefore affirm the dismissal of Dr. Braid’s federal case.
Argued November 15, 2024 — Decided July 10, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:20-cv-01223-RLY-MG — Richard L. Young, Judge.
Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge. When vandals damaged air conditioning units on its hotel rooftop, Best Inn Midwest, LLC (Best Inn) filed a claim with its insurer, Ohio Security Insurance Company (Ohio Security), which eventually denied the claim and began inquiries to determine whether the hotel was vacant and thus not covered under the terms of the policy. When Best Inn failed to supply Ohio Security with the requested information, the insurer filed suit seeking a declaration that the insurance policy did not offer coverage for the claims. Best Inn counter-sued claiming Ohio Security denied the claim in bad faith, and Ohio Security moved the court for summary judgment on that claim... On May 3, 2021, Ohio Security sent Reddy and his attorney a letter explaining the result of its investigation, including its expert reports and its finding that the hotel was vacant as defined by the policy. Best Inn alleged in filings to the court that some of the logs were destroyed by dishonest employees, and that many guest logs were consumed in a fire that occurred on November 3, 2020. On May 28, 2021, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the court grant Ohio Security’s motion for sanctions and declare the hotel vacant for the period of January 1, 2019, through December 20, 2019. The district court adopted that recommendation and entered the order on August 16, 2021. Once the district court found that the hotel was vacant as a matter of law, it granted summary judgment to Ohio Security on Best Inn’s counterclaim for bad faith; there was nothing left to decide. Best Inn appeals both the district court’s sanction order as well as its grant of Ohio Security’s motion for summary judgment... The reasonable sanctions led to the appropriate grant of summary judgment, thus allowing us to AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all respects.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 10, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. No. 22-cv-6008 — James P. Hanlon, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Monzer al-Kassar, a prisoner previously incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute in Terre Haute, Indiana, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 to 2680. He alleged that from September to October 2016, the Bureau of Prisons negligently and intentionally allowed deplorable conditions at FCI Terre Haute and denied him medical care. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the United States. Al-Kassar appeals, and we affirm.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 10, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 19-cv-00030 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Flynt (also known as Flint) Lee is required by Illinois law to register as a sex offender. Lee sued the Illinois State Police and a Chicago Police officer who, on a single occasion, refused to provide him with an application to waive the registration fee, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. We affirm the judgment.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 10, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:23CR00093-005 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Tameico Johnson pleaded guilty to distributing and conspiring to distribute controlled substances, for which he was sentenced to 250 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We told Johnson of counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind would typically involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Submitted July 9, 2025 — Decided July 10, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. No. 3:21-CV-852-PPS-AZ — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
Before THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge; JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Brent Taylor, an Indiana prisoner who needs prescription eyeglasses, appeals the grant of summary judgment rejecting his claims that the prison’s optometrist was deliberately indifferent to his eye condition and that a deputy warden retaliated against him for complaining about his medical needs. We affirm.
Argued February 14, 2023 — Decided July 11, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Western District of Wisconsin. No. 3:20-cv-00856-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.
Before ROVNER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. This Title IX action arose from the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s decision to readmit a star football player after expelling him for sexually assaulting two female students. The player submitted a petition for readmission shortly after a state court jury, deliberating a different charge using a different standard of proof, found him not guilty of sexually assaulting the women. According to the petition for readmission—submitted mere weeks before the football season began—evidence developed at the state court trial cast doubt on the University’s conclusion, after its own investigation, that the player committed sexual assault as defined by the student code of conduct. Under pressure from influential parties, and without hearing from the survivors of the alleged assault, the University Chancellor granted the petition. One of the women, Isabelle Arana, responded by filing this suit. She alleges the school was deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment she suffered. The district court dismissed the case after granting the University’s motion for summary judgment. The court acknowledged a jury could conclude the University acted with deliberate indifference if it made its readmission decision in response to public pressure. But the court rejected Arana’s argument that the harassment she suffered was actionable under Title IX because it deprived her of access to educational opportunities. We find, however, that there is a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment Arana experienced was so severe and whether the University’s response was so clearly unreasonable that it had a detrimental effect on Arana’s education. A reasonable jury could resolve these disputes in Arana’s favor and find for her on her deliberate indifference claim. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Argued April 8, 2025 — Decided July 11, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:21-cr-378 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
Before HAMILITON, LEE, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. Nicholas Karagianis was indicted on federal drug and firearm charges. He later entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to all counts. As part of the agreement, he and the government stipulated that, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the final offense level for all counts was 31. The plea agreement also contained a provision that waived Karagianis’s ability to appeal an adverse ruling on any motion he might file to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In anticipation of sentencing, the probation department prepared a presentence report (PSR). Rather than agreeing that the total offense level was 31, however, the PSR recommended a final offense level of 33 based on an additional two-level firearm enhancement not in the plea agreement. At a combined change-of-plea and sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation, found the final offense level to be 33, and imposed a below-guideline sentence. A short time later, Karagianis sent a letter to the court, stating he was misled by his counsel about how his sentence would be calculated if he pleaded guilty. Karagianis raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly because the district court had failed to inform him about the waiver of his right to appeal an adverse ruling of a § 3582(c)(2) motion. He also faults the court for not explaining the impact the PSR would have on sentencing. Additionally, Karagianis argues that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to object to the PSR’s proposed final offense level of 33. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
Argued January 14, 2025 — Decided July 11, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:22-cv-07056 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.
Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Jason Rahimzadeh filed an underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim with Ace American Insurance Company (“Ace”). Ace denied the claim on the ground that he did not qualify as an insured under his employer’s commercial automobile insurance policy. Mr. Rahimzadeh then filed this action in Illinois state court, alleging that Ace had breached the insurance contract. After Ace removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the district court granted Ace’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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