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Argued May 23, 2024 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:22-cv-05936 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
Before JACKSON-AKIWUMI, LEE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. Dyson Technology, Ltd., brought a trademark infringement action against multiple e-commerce stores allegedly selling counterfeit Dyson goods. The district court entered a default judgment in Dyson’s favor but did not award one aspect of the remedy Dyson sought: the infringing sellers’ profits. The district court reasoned that Dyson had provided evidence of the revenue the e-commerce stores earned from selling the counterfeit goods, but not the profits. Because the district court erred in its interpretation of the relevant trademark infringement law and because Dyson met its burden, we reverse and remand.
Submitted March 17, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:23-cv-00490 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.
Before FRANK. H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge; THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge;
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Arnold Phillips, a doctor, sued several members of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights principally in connection with the suspension of his medical license. The district court dismissed his case because his claim was barred by a settlement agreement. We affirm.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Nos. 02-CR-1165; 13-CR-808 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge;
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
While on pretrial release, Bernardino Ribota absconded and became a fugitive for nearly a decade. The district court then entered a default judgment for Ribota’s bond, secured by the equity in his house. Although Ribota was eventually caught, he later pleaded guilty to contempt of court, see 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and moved, unsuccessfully, to have the default judgment remitted. We affirm.
Submitted March 17, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 22-CV-161-JPS — J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge; THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge;
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Tyrone Stallings, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that his right to confront adverse witnesses at trial was violated when a non-testifying confidential informant’s statements were admitted into evidence. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. But because any violation of Stallings’s right to confront an adverse witness would have been harmless, we affirm the district court’s decision.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 08-cr-746-5 — Mary M. Rowland, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge; NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Alfonso Chavez appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court concluded that Chavez failed to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release, and alternatively, that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting his motion. Because the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22 CV 6886 —Young B. Kim, Magistrate Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge; NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Adair Joyner, the father of a detainee who died in jail, appeals a judgment approving the apportionment of proceeds from the wrongful-death settlement. We affirm.
Argued January 28, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:22−cv−05732 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Members of a local union sued their national parent organization for imposing an illegal trustee-ship. The parties eventually resolved the case by entering into a consent judgment, leaving only one decision for the district court: whether to award attorneys’ fees to the local union members. The district court declined to do so. Because it did not abuse its substantial discretion to make that decision, we affirm.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 24, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 24 C 10263 — Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge; NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Cedric Greene appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint for improper
venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 25, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Southern District of Illinois. No. 16-CV-1018-SMY — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge;
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Dallas McIntosh, an Illinois prisoner, alleged that police officers, prosecutors, and the City of Fairview Heights, Illinois, deprived him of his constitutional rights by prosecuting and wrongfully convicting him in 2012. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court first dismissed the prosecutors based on absolute immunity. McIntosh then moved to dismiss without prejudice his remaining claims, see FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2), conceding that his conviction was intact and thus Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred his suit. The court granted his motion but dismissed the suit with prejudice. McIntosh appeals both dismissals. When a plaintiff moves for dismissal without prejudice, the court may not dismiss the action with prejudice unless the court first provides the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to withdraw the motion. See Carter v. City of Alton, 922 F.3d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 2019). The court did not supply McIntosh with that opportunity, and its use of absolute immunity was overbroad. But because Heck bars the entire suit, we affirm the judgment and modify it to be without prejudice.
Argued March 4, 2025 — Decided March 25, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. No. 1:21CR25-001 — Holly A. Brady, Chief Judge.
Before BRENNAN, ST. EVE, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Gregory Johnson of attempting to use a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing child pornography. When imposing the sentence, the district court waived any fine based on his inability to pay, 18 U.S.C. § 3571, and it also determined that Johnson was indigent and therefore not subject to the discretionary assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (“JVTA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3014. But the court imposed a $5,000 assessment under the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act (“AVAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2259A. Johnson challenges the imposition of this § 2259A assessment, arguing that it cannot be reconciled with the court’s finding of indigency. He contends that the district court erred in imposing the AVAA assessment, and further erred in failing to explain the discrepancy. We take this opportunity to clarify that the § 2259A assessment is mandatory, regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay. But a court has discretion in setting the amount. In doing so, it must consider prescribed factors, including the defendant’s financial condition. In this case, the district court correctly recognized that the AVAA assessment is mandatory and imposed it accordingly. The court did not explain, however, why $5,000 was an appropriate amount, particularly given its findings about Johnson’s financial condition for purposes of other financial penalties. We take no position on whether $5,000 is an appropriate assessment; we simply lack an explanation that allows us to review the court’s discretionary decision. Therefore, we vacate the AVAA assessment and order a limited remand for the district court to impose an AVVA assessment and explain its basis for doing so.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 25, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:20-CR-00332(5) — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge;
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Antonio Maxey pleaded guilty to participating in a drug trafficking conspiracy. The district court sentenced him to 62 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. Maxey appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, and Maxey did not respond to the motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to subjects that counsel discusses... We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
Argued November 13, 2024 — Decided March 25, 2025
Case Type: Agency
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A000-000-000
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge; JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
C.N.T., a Guatemalan citizen, petitions for review of the denial of his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. C.N.T. fears he will be tortured, and indeed killed, by the Sinaloa Cartel if he is removed to Guatemala. The immigration judge (IJ) and Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) both concluded that C.N.T. failed to show that he faced a substantial risk of torture in Guatemala. Because those decisions are supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition for review.
Argued November 6, 2024 — March 25, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:20-cv-06829 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
Before BRENNAN, KOLAR, and MALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Vonzell Scott fell victim to a horrendous shooting while waiting in his car at a Wendy’s drive-thru line. He then sued the fast-food chain, claiming its negligence in failing to provide overnight security guards caused his injury. The district court granted summary judgment for Wendy’s. Our sympathies may lie with Mr. Scott, but because this extreme, isolated, and unprovoked display of violence was not reasonably foreseeable, we affirm.
Argued January 14, 2025 — Decided March 25, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:10-cv-01127-WED — William E. Duffin, Magistrate Judge.
Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. A Wisconsin jury in 2006 found Jacob Powers guilty of enticing and twice sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl. Powers unsuccessfully challenged those convictions in state court, raising various claims on both direct and collateral review. Powers now seeks federal habeas corpus review, claiming he lacked competency at his trial and that his lawyer was ineffective for not raising this issue. The district court denied his petition, so Powers appeals. Looking back almost two decades—and considering three posttrial evaluations of Powers’s competency, his demeanor at trial, and that his appellate attorney spoke with his trial counsel and chose not to pursue an incompetency claim—we agree with the district court and affirm.
Argued March 5, 2024 — Decided March 26, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Central District of Illinois. No. 2:01-cr-20004 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and LEE and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. In June 2020, John Johnson pleaded guilty to a two-count indictment charging him with distributing large volumes of cocaine on two different days in 2014. He was serving a term of supervised release for a 2001 crack cocaine conviction at the time, and so his guilty plea also led to the revocation of his supervised release. At Johnson’s request, the district court held a combined sentencing hearing and addressed the new offenses and his violation of supervised release on the same day. For the former, the court imposed a sentence of 180 months of imprisonment and six years of supervised release for each count, to be served concurrently. As for the latter, the court imposed a sentence of 24 months of imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the 180–month sentence. Johnson subsequently filed a motion requesting that the 24-month sentence be reduced pursuant to the First Step Act. The district court denied the request believing that Johnson was not eligible for a reduction, and Johnson appealed. We conclude that Johnson’s revocation sentence is eligible for a reduction under the First Step Act; however, because his concurrent 180-month sentence renders the district court’s error harmless, we affirm.
Argued January 14, 2025 — Decided March 26, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:22-cv-01952-MPB-MJD — Matthew P. Brookman, Judge.
Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Susan Kinder believed her employer, a county prosecutor’s office, racially discriminated against her when it reassigned her to a new role. She alleged
violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. But her statutory claim was untimely, and her constitutional claim is barred because the prosecutor’s office is not a suable “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. So, we affirm the summary judgment decision against her.
Argued March 4, 2025 — Decided March 26, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. No. 1:21-CR-32-HAB — Holly A. Brady, Chief Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge; NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Police officers in Fort Wayne, Indiana, executed a search warrant at Payne Randle’s house and found drugs and guns. Randle soon faced federal charges for attempting to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, id. § 841(a)(1), possessing a gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possessing a gun as a felon, id. § 922(g)(1). Randle moved to suppress the evidence because, he asserted, the officer who supplied the warrant affidavit had lied about smelling raw marijuana outdoors from 25 to 30 feet away. The district court held a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and five other officers testified and corroborated the affiant’s statements about the odor. The district court denied Randle’s motion to suppress because he had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit included false statements. A jury convicted Payne, and the district court sentenced Payne to 240 months’ imprisonment. He appeals, seizing on some improvident phrasing in the district court’s opinion to argue that the judge clearly erred and misapplied the rules for assessing evidence at a Franks hearing. We affirm.
Submitted March 21, 2025 — Decided March 27, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 23-C-602 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge; NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Francisco Rodriguez Ruiz, Jr., a Wisconsin prisoner, sued correctional officer Rodney Reynolds for using excessive force in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for Reynolds, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that he used excessive force to get Ruiz to comply with his orders. We affirm.
Argued March 4, 2025 — Decided March 27, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Central District of Illinois. No. 2:23-cv-02280-CRL-KLM — Colleen R. Lawless, Judge.
Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge; AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge; NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
After the University of Illinois investigated and dismissed him for sexually assaulting another student, John Doe sued, arguing that the University’s investigation was discriminatory and violated his right to due process. The district court initially granted Doe’s unopposed motion to proceed under a pseudonym, but the defendants later moved to remove that pseudonym in light of recent decisions from this court. The district court granted the motion, rejecting Doe’s argument that his race and the nature of the allegations create a substantial risk of harm necessitating pseudonymity. Doe appeals, repeating his argument that the racial dynamics of the underlying misconduct create a significant risk of retaliation and hostility. But Doe’s argument rests on overly broad assumptions, and he has not presented evidence of a substantial risk of harm directed towards him. We affirm the district court’s order removing the pseudonym, but remand to allow Doe the opportunity to proceed under his name.
Argued September 13, 2024 — Decided March 28, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 22-CR-55 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
Before EASTERBROOK, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Jaron Jackson pleaded guilty to sex trafficking of a minor and transportation of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), 2252A(a)(1). The sentence is 240 months’ imprisonment. Jackson’s appeal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) presents a single argument: that the district court should have suppressed evidence (photographs, text messages, and a video) found in his cell phone. The search was authorized by a warrant, and Jackson concedes that the warrant was supported by probable cause. But he contends that the police took too long—40 days after his arrest—before seeking that warrant. The district court, however, denied the motion after concluding that the delay did not permit the police to obtain any evidence they would not have received had they sought a warrant immediately. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100549 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2023). The district judge found that the motion was untimely, which is beyond dispute. The court set July 1, 2022, as the deadline for pretrial motions. Jackson did not file any. In January 2023 the court appointed a different lawyer for Jackson, and in May 2023 counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from the phone. That motion was ten months late. Only “good cause” permits a district court to resolve an untimely motion to suppress. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C), (c)(3). The district court held a hearing to consider whether “good cause” justified the delay and concluded that it does not. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100549 at *6–9. That conclusion does not reflect any clearly erroneous finding or abuse of discretion. We could stop there, but Jackson then could seek relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255 on the ground that the lawyers’ unjustified delay violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to the assistance of counsel. One question in such a proceeding would be whether deficient legal assistance caused prejudice—in other words, whether a timely motion to suppress would have been granted. The district judge addressed that question to fend off any collateral attack. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100549 at *9–20. We think it prudent to do the same... The district court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the phone. AFFIRMED
Argued September 13, 2024 — Decided March 28, 2025
Case Type: Civil
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22 CV 5963 — Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.
Before EASTERBROOK, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. When Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court was defeated in 1987, his name became attached not only to a political strategy (“Borking”) but also to a statute, 18 U.S.C. §2710 (the “Bork Act”). This law, more formally called the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA or “the Act”), was the result of bipartisan revulsion against the ease with which reporters discovered what Bork and his family had rented on video tapes. The reporters did not turn up any dirt (Bork and his family watched Hitchcock mysteries, John Hughes comedies, British costume dramas, and spy thrillers) but the ready availability of rental information caused consternation in Congress, some members of which may have had other viewing predilections. Using terminology that is now obsolete, the Act forbids the disclosure, by any “video tape service provider”, of “personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider” without the consumer’s consent. 18 U.S.C. §2710(b)(1). Section 2710(a)(4) defines “video tape service provider” to include any entity that sells, rents, or delivers “prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials”; the “similar” clause and the reference to “delivery” as well as rental makes the statute relevant to video that is streamed over the Internet. Under §2710(a)(1) “the term ‘consumer’ means any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider”. This suit presents the question what it means for a person to be a “subscriber”, a term that the Act does not define... Our case is almost identical to Salazar. The decisions from the First Circuit and Eleventh Circuit (Ellis, Yeshov, and Perry) ask whether a person becomes a “subscriber” by downloading and using an application (“app”) that offers videos, without necessarily providing the app’s creator with personal information such as a name or email address. The First Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have reached incompatible conclusions about how the definition in §2710(a)(1) works for that situation. We do not address it here. It is enough to hold that, when a person does furnish valuable data in exchange for benefits, that person becomes a “consumer” as long as the entity on the other side of the transaction is a “video tape service provider”. Plaintiffs’ complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Submitted March 28, 2025 — Decided March 28, 2025
Case Type: Prisoner
Central District of Illinois. No. 1:21-cv-01152-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge; KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge;
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Mark Byrd, an Illinois prisoner, maintains that prison officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when they consciously disregarded a serious risk to his health and safety by improperly wearing the masks meant to prevent the spread of COVID-19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Byrd lacked evidence that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his exposure to COVID-19. Because a reasonable jury could not find that the defendants knew of and consciously disregarded Byrd’s risk of contracting COVID-19, we affirm.
Submitted March 28, 2025 — Decided March 28, 2025
Case Type: Criminal
Southern District of Illinois. No. 19-cr-40034-JPG-2 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge; KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge;
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Bradley Caudle, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied the motion after ruling that he had not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release, and that, even if he did, the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against release. The second reason alone is adequate, and we affirm.
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