In January, the OIG sent a memorandum to new USAID leadership identifying vulnerabilities and challenges to accountability and transparency within foreign assistance programs, as well as potential fixes. The issues discussed in this memorandum include:

1. Resistance from United Nations agencies and foreign-based nongovernmental organizations to sharing information with OIG about potential misconduct.
2. Limitations on vetting of aid organizations for ties to designated terrorist organizations and known corrupt actors.
3. Limitations in obtaining data about USAID-funded subawardees.

Read the full memorandum at the link below.

OIG’s cross-continent investigation resulted in a Syrian national, Mahmoud Al Hafyan, being charged in a 12-count indictment alleging major fraud against the United States. Al Hafyan was charged with diverting more than $9 million in U.S.-funded humanitarian aid intended for Syrian civilians. Instead, Al Hafyan provided the humanitarian aid to armed combatant groups, including the Al-Nusrah Front, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization.

The case represents one of the most significant diversions of USAID-funded humanitarian aid that USAID-OIG has investigated. It reflects our ongoing commitment to ensure that taxpayer-funded aid is not diverted to terrorist organizations.

On January 7, following our investigation, the government debarred a former foreign service officer for 20 years for violating USAID’s Counter Trafficking in Persons policy.

OIG and U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) had found evidence showing that the former mission director posted online reviews of over 40 sex workers located in the United States and overseas. He told OIG and DS special agents that he had solicited and paid sex workers while on temporary duty assignments and while he was posted overseas as a foreign service officer.

OIG’s investigative work resulted in Chemonics International, Inc., agreeing to pay $3,119,582 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by submitting fraudulent claims for payment to USAID. This comes as a result of a coordinated investigation by USAID OIG, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri.

The settlement resolves allegations that Chemonics acted recklessly in failing to detect fraudulent charges by its subcontractor, Zenith Carex, for certain delivery services in Nigeria, and passed the charges on to USAID under the Global Health Supply Chain-Procurement and Supply Chain Management contract.

OIG’s investigation also led to Zenith’s debarment for three years from U.S.-funded programs for submitting fraudulent and grossly inflated invoices for health commodity distribution services.

On January 10, USAID debarred an NGO’s Deputy Chief of Party on a USAID-funded award in Syria for 3 years for diverting vouchers and causing harm to program participants.

The debarment came as a result of OIG's investigation into an allegation that the Deputy Chief of Party solicited bribes and diverted non-food items and food vouchers away from beneficiaries. According to the allegation, the individual also had an undeclared conflict of interest and manipulated award beneficiaries.

Gaps in USAID’s Award Administration, Monitoring, and Incident Reporting Hindered Its Ability to Detect Widespread Food Diversion

We initiated this evaluation to assess USAID’s oversight of emergency food assistance awards in Ethiopia prior to the discovery of widespread food diversion. Our objectives were to evaluate the effectiveness of USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA)'s award administration, monitoring, and management of incident reporting.

What We Found:

• BHA lacked controls to allocate the appropriate number of agreement officer representatives for Ethiopia and to maintain award records in the Agency’s official system. 
• BHA failed to effectively monitor emergency food assistance in Ethiopia. 
• BHA did not enforce timely reporting, had unclear reporting requirements, and did not fully document or respond to implementer incident reports. 

We made 11 recommendations to improve BHA’s award administration, monitoring, and incident reporting policies and procedures. Our investigation into diversion of food aid continues.

Action Needed to Enhance Oversight of Energy Procurements

We conducted this audit to:

1. Assess USAID/Ukraine’s oversight of the Project’s procurement process and
2. Determine the extent to which USAID/Ukraine verified that the Project delivered equipment and materials to recipients as intended. 

What We Found

• USAID/Ukraine did not define requirements to receive procurement information essential to its oversight of the Energy Security Project and did not perform a mandatory assessment of a Ukrainian government-controlled company. 
• USAID/Ukraine verified the delivery of sampled energy equipment and materials, but information gaps exist, and not all inventory and property requirements were met.

We made five recommendations to improve USAID/Ukraine’s oversight of the Project’s procurement processes and monitoring of equipment and material deliveries.

USAID Can Strengthen Efforts to Ensure Compliance and Improve Monitoring to Protect Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for Humanitarian Assistance

The inspection objectives were to determine:

1. Whether USAID ensured that pre-award requirements related to protect against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) were met prior to executing BHA awards for its Ukraine response and
2. To what extent USAID ensured that implementers that received BHA awards for the Ukraine response operationalized PSEA-related requirements. 

What We Found:

• USAID did not consistently ensure that implementer applications for Ukraine response awards met PSEA-related, pre-award requirements and did not maintain pre-award documentation in the Agency’s official records system.
• BHA did not fully monitor the implementation of PSEA requirements for Ukraine response awards.

We made three recommendations to improve compliance with and monitoring of PSEA-related award requirements, which can be used to inform future United States-funded humanitarian assistance programming. 

This Special Inspector General report summarizes U.S. programs and operations from October 1 through December 31, 2024, in support of the U.S. government’s response to the Ukraine-Russia war. The report describes the oversight work of the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, the Government Accountability Office, and the other members of the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. government in support of Operation Enduring Sentinel, as well as the work of the DoD, the State, and USAID to further the U.S. government’s policy goals in Afghanistan during the period of October 1 through December 31, 2024.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies.

This quarterly report describes the activities of the U.S. government in support of Operation Inherent Resolve as well as the work of the DoD, State, and the USAID to further the U.S. government’s policy goals in Iraq and Syria during the period of October 1 through December 31, 2024

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies.