

Preventing Soft Target Terrorist Attacks

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TERRORISM INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL ATTACKS ON SOFT TARGETS

<h3>Airport Terminals</h3>	<h3>Shopping Malls</h3>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vulnerable to insider threats • Multiple locations to place explosives • Open accessibility—outside security • Large number of people in a small area • Numerous targets and adjacent structures • Size and remote location of some facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unrestricted public access • Large number of access points • Unrestricted access to adjacent buildings • Access to suppliers, vendors, and maintenance workers • Limited employee background checks • Limited security force
<h3>Stadiums/Arenas</h3>	<h3>Convention Centers</h3>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large number of people entering with varying levels of inspection • Limited control of vehicles entering area • Limited or no inspection of items carried in by event participants, vendors, contractors, etc. • Limited facility security between events • Large number of people at scheduled and publicly announced events 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open access • Large urban locations • Limited background checks on employees/vendors • Little or no screening of patrons • Little standoff for parking areas • Infrequent use of intrusion detection systems • Deliveries are unmonitored
<h3>Hotels</h3>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unrestricted public access • Unrestricted access to areas adjacent to buildings • Limited employee background checks • Limited security force • Unprotected HVAC systems • Building designs are not security-oriented • Multiple locations to place explosives or hazardous agents 	

Data sourced to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Infrastructure Protection Series*, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation/U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Attack on Nairobi Mall Highlights Continued Threat From Al-Shabaab* (September 2013)

INDICATORS OF PREOPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE/ PREPARATION FOR AN ATTACK

- Suspicious observation/unusual questions about security procedures
- Engaging in suspicious actions to provoke or observe response
- Interest in entry points, peak days, hours of operation, security personnel, cameras, and access controls (alarms, gates, locks, etc.)
- Observation of security reaction drills; multiple false alarms
- Loitering, parking, or standing in the same area over multiple days
- Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance or security personnel
- Attention to/avoidance of security cameras
- Attempts to disguise appearance from visit to visit
- Interest in obtaining site plans, ingress and egress routes, and information on employees or the public
- Clothing not appropriate to the season
- Staring at or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering and/or leaving the facility or parking areas
- Increase in anonymous telephone/e-mail threats in conjunction with suspected surveillance incidents
 - Indicates possible surveillance of threat reaction procedures
- Discreet use of still cameras/video recorders
- Note taking or sketching
- Suspicious purchases of unusual quantities of items that could be used to construct explosive devices (hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer)
- Suspicion that a storage facility is being used to construct/store explosive devices
- Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or a sensitive area

SOLUTIONS

- Review, update, and validate all emergency and crisis response plans
- Coordinate response plans across functional disciplines (police, fire, medical, and private sector)
- Conduct exercises of the plan
- Raise awareness among employees by conducting all-hazards training
- Raise community awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities
- Ensure that all emergency communications equipment is operational
- Report suspicious activity to proper authorities, including missing and stolen equipment, weapons, uniforms, etc.
- Install secure locks and protection on all internal/external doors and windows, with quick-release capability from within
- Establish safe areas within the facility for people to assemble and seek refuge during a crisis
- Consider establishing/implementing an emergency communications system for personnel, such as phone trees or text messages
- Consider installing CCTV systems, intruder detection systems, and lighting to cover key areas
- Train security personnel to watch for
 - Unattended or suspicious vehicles on or near facilities
 - Repeated visitors or outsiders who have no apparent business in nonpublic areas
 - Abandoned parcels, suitcases, backpacks, and packages
 - Other unusual activities
- Develop policies and procedures for dealing with hoaxes and false alarms
- Conduct threat analyses, vulnerability assessments, consequence analyses, risk assessments, and security audits on a regular and ongoing basis
- Provide appropriate signage to restrict access to nonpublic areas
- Remove vehicles that have been parked for an unusual length of time
- Identify key areas in or adjacent to buildings and prohibit parking in these areas
- Install fences or lightweight barriers that are easy to store
- Conduct background checks on all employees
- Incorporate security awareness and appropriate response procedures for security situations into employee training programs
- Maintain an adequately sized, equipped, and trained security force
- Develop policies and procedures for dealing with the media and the general public in the event of an incident
 - Advise them of the situation
 - Defuse rumors and panic
- Identify entry and exit points to be used in emergencies
- Ensure that those points are free of obstructions and can be fully utilized
- Identify alternate gathering points where employees can meet for coordinated evacuation
- Require facility management and security staff to join a local and/or state fusion center in order to receive and share information about potential or real terrorist attacks

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